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of their growth； the latter； owing to their decay。 In like manner；
also； both those who are too quick and those who are too slow have bad
memories。 The former are too soft； the latter too hard （in the texture
of their receiving organs）； so that in the case of the former the
presented image （though imprinted） does not remain in the soul；
while on the latter it is not imprinted at all。
But then； if this truly describes what happens in the genesis of
memory； （the question stated above arises：） when one remembers； is
it this impressed affection that he remembers； or is it the
objective thing from which this was derived？ If the former； it would
follow that we remember nothing which is absent； if the latter； how is
it possible that； though perceiving directly only the impression； we
remember that absent thing which we do not perceive？ Granted that
there is in us something like an impression or picture； why should the
perception of the mere impression be memory of something else； instead
of being related to this impression alone？ For when one actually
remembers； this impression is what he contemplates； and this is what
he perceives。 How then does he remember what is not present？ One might
as well suppose it possible also to see or hear that which is not
present。 In reply； we suggest that this very thing is quite
conceivable； nay； actually occurs in experience。 A picture painted
on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness： that is； while one and
the same； it is both of these； although the 'being' of both is not the
same； and one may contemplate it either as a picture； or as a
likeness。 Just in the same way we have to conceive that the mnemonic
presentation within us is something which by itself is merely an
object of contemplation； while； in…relation to something else； it is
also a presentation of that other thing。 In so far as it is regarded
in itself； it is only an object of contemplation； or a presentation；
but when considered as relative to something else； e。g。 as its
likeness； it is also a mnemonic token。 Hence； whenever the residual
sensory process implied by it is actualized in consciousness； if the
soul perceives this in so far as it is something absolute； it
appears to occur as a mere thought or presentation； but if the soul
perceives it qua related to something else； then；…just as when one
contemplates the painting in the picture as being a likeness； and
without having （at the moment） seen the actual Koriskos；
contemplates it as a likeness of Koriskos； and in that case the
experience involved in this contemplation of it （as relative） is
different from what one has when he contemplates it simply as a
painted figure…（so in the case of memory we have the analogous
difference for）； of the objects in the soul； the one （the unrelated
object） presents itself simply as a thought； but the other （the
related object） just because； as in the painting； it is a likeness；
presents itself as a mnemonic token。
We can now understand why it is that sometimes； when we have such
processes； based on some former act of perception； occurring in the
soul； we do not know whether this really implies our having had
perceptions corresponding to them； and we doubt whether the case is or
is not one of memory。 But occasionally it happens that （while thus
doubting） we get a sudden idea and recollect that we heard or saw
something formerly。 This （occurrence of the 'sudden idea'） happens
whenever； from contemplating a mental object as absolute； one
changes his point of view； and regards it as relative to something
else。
The opposite （sc。 to the case of those who at first do not recognize
their phantasms as mnemonic） also occurs； as happened in the cases
of Antipheron of Oreus and others suffering from mental derangement；
for they were accustomed to speak of their mere phantasms as facts
of their past experience； and as if remembering them。 This takes place
whenever one contemplates what is not a likeness as if it were a
likeness。
Mnemonic exercises aim at preserving one's memory of something by
repeatedly reminding him of it； which implies nothing else （on the
learner's part） than the frequent contemplation of something （viz。 the
'mnemonic'； whatever it may be） as a likeness； and not as out of
relation。
As regards the question； therefore； what memory or remembering is；
it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation；
related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation； and as to
the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function；
（it has been shown） that it is a function of the primary faculty of
sense…perception； i。e。 of that faculty whereby we perceive time。
2
Next comes the subject of Recollection； in dealing with which we
must assume as fundamental the truths elicited above in our
introductory discussions。 For recollection is not the 'recovery' or
'acquisition' of memory； since at the instant when one at first learns
（a fact of science） or experiences （a particular fact of sense）； he
does not thereby 'recover' a memory； inasmuch as none has preceded；
nor does he acquire one ab initio。 It is only at the instant when
the aforesaid state or affection （of the aisthesis or upolepsis） is
implanted in the soul that memory exists； and therefore memory is
not itself implanted concurrently with the continuous implantation
of the （original） sensory experience。
Further： at the very individual and concluding instant when first
（the sensory experience or scientific knowledge） has been completely
implanted； there is then already established in the person affected
the （sensory） affection； or the scientific knowledge （if one ought
to apply the term 'scientific knowledge' to the （mnemonic） state or
affection； and indeed one may well remember； in the 'incidental'
sense； some of the things （i。e。 ta katholou） which are properly
objects of scientific knowledge）； but to remember； strictly and
properly speaking； is an activity which will not be immanent until the
original experience has undergone lapse of time。 For one remembers now
what one saw or otherwise experienced formerly； the moment of the
original experience and the moment of the memory of it are never
identical。
Again； （even when time has elapsed； and one can be said really to
have acquired memory； this is not necessarily recollection； for
firstly） it is obviously possible； without any present act of
recollection； to remember as a continued consequence of the original
perception or other experience； whereas when （after an interval of
obliviscence） one recovers some scientific knowledge which he had
before； or some perception； or some other experience； the state of
which we above declared to be memory； i