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350 BC
ON MEMORY AND REMINISCENCE
by Aristotle
translated by J。 I。 Beare
1
WE have； in the next place； to treat of Memory and Remembering；
considering its nature； its cause； and the part of the soul to which
this experience； as well as that of Recollecting； belongs。 For the
persons who possess a retentive memory are not identical with those
who excel in power of recollection； indeed； as a rule； slow people
have a good memory； whereas those who are quick…witted and clever
are better at recollecting。
We must first form a true conception of these objects of memory； a
point on which mistakes are often made。 Now to remember the future
is not possible； but this is an object of opinion or expectation
（and indeed there might be actually a science of expectation； like
that of divination； in which some believe）； nor is there memory of the
present； but only sense…perception。 For by the latter we know not
the future； nor the past； but the present only。 But memory relates
to the past。 No one would say that he remembers the present； when it
is present； e。g。 a given white object at the moment when he sees it；
nor would one say that he remembers an object of scientific
contemplation at the moment when he is actually contemplating it；
and has it full before his mind；…of the former he would say only
that he perceives it； of the latter only that he knows it。 But when
one has scientific knowledge； or perception； apart from the
actualizations of the faculty concerned； he thus 'remembers' （that the
angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles）； as to
the former； that he learned it； or thought it out for himself； as to
the latter； that he heard； or saw； it； or had some such sensible
experience of it。 For whenever one exercises the faculty of
remembering； he must say within himself； 'I formerly heard （or
otherwise perceived） this；' or 'I formerly had this thought'。
Memory is； therefore； neither Perception nor Conception； but a state
or affection of one of these； conditioned by lapse of time。 As already
observed； there is no such thing as memory of the present while
present； for the present is object only of perception； and the future；
of expectation； but the object of memory is the past。 All memory；
therefore； implies a time elapsed； consequently only those animals
which perceive time remember； and the organ whereby they perceive time
is also that whereby they remember。
The subject of 'presentation' has been already considered in our
work On the Soul。 Without a presentation intellectual activity is
impossible。 For there is in such activity an incidental affection
identical with one also incidental in geometrical demonstrations。
For in the latter case； though we do not for the purpose of the
proof make any use of the fact that the quantity in the triangle
（for example； which we have drawn） is determinate； we nevertheless
draw it determinate in quantity。 So likewise when one exerts the
intellect （e。g。 on the subject of first principles）； although the
object may not be quantitative； one envisages it as quantitative；
though he thinks it in abstraction from quantity； while； on the
other hand； if the object of the intellect is essentially of the class
of things that are quantitative； but indeterminate； one envisages it
as if it had determinate quantity； though subsequently； in thinking
it； he abstracts from its determinateness。 Why we cannot exercise
the intellect on any object absolutely apart from the continuous； or
apply it even to non…temporal things unless in connexion with time； is
another question。 Now； one must cognize magnitude and motion by
means of the same faculty by which one cognizes time （i。e。 by that
which is also the faculty of memory）； and the presentation （involved
in such cognition） is an affection of the sensus communis； whence this
follows； viz。 that the cognition of these objects （magnitude； motion
time） is effected by the （said sensus communis； i。e。 the） primary
faculty of perception。 Accordingly； memory （not merely of sensible；
but） even of intellectual objects involves a presentation： hence we
may conclude that it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only
incidentally； while directly and essentially it belongs to the primary
faculty of sense…perception。
Hence not only human beings and the beings which possess opinion
or intelligence； but also certain other animals； possess memory。 If
memory were a function of （pure） intellect； it would not have been
as it is an attribute of many of the lower animals； but probably； in
that case； no mortal beings would have had memory； since； even as
the case stands； it is not an attribute of them all； just because
all have not the faculty of perceiving time。 Whenever one actually
remembers having seen or heard； or learned； something； he includes
in this act （as we have already observed） the consciousness of
'formerly'； and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a
distinction in time。
Accordingly if asked； of which among the parts of the soul memory is
a function； we reply： manifestly of that part to which
'presentation' appertains； and all objects capable of being
presented （viz。 aistheta） are immediately and properly objects of
memory； while those （viz。 noeta） which necessarily involve （but only
involve） presentation are objects of memory incidentally。
One might ask how it is possible that though the affection （the
presentation） alone is present； and the （related） fact absent； the
latter…that which is not present…is remembered。 （The question arises）；
because it is clear that we must conceive that which is generated
through sense…perception in the sentient soul； and in the part of
the body which is its seat…viz。 that affection the state whereof we
call memory…to be some such thing as a picture。 The process of
movement （sensory stimulation） involved the act of perception stamps
in； as it were； a sort of impression of the percept； just as persons
do who make an impression with a seal。 This explains why； in those who
are strongly moved owing to passion； or time of life； no mnemonic
impression is formed； just as no impression would be formed if the
movement of the seal were to impinge on running water； while there are
others in whom； owing to the receiving surface being frayed； as
happens to （the stucco on） old （chamber） walls； or owing to the
hardness of the receiving surface； the requisite impression is not
implanted at all。 Hence both very young and very old persons are
defective in memory； they are in a state of flux； the former because
of their growth； the latter； owing to their decay