representative government-第68章

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ectors　of　prisons　to　take　care　that　the　rules　laid　down　by　Parliament　are　observed；　and　to　suggest　others　if　the　state　of　the　gaols　shows　them　to　be　requisite：　as　there　are　inspectors　of　factories；　and　inspectors　of　schools；　to　watch　over　the　observance　of　the　Acts　of　Parliament　relating　to　the　first；　and　the　fulfilment　of　the　conditions　on　which　State　assistance　is　granted　to　the　latter。　　　But；　if　the　administration　of　justice；　police　and　gaols　included；　is　both　so　universal　a　concern；　and　so　much　a　matter　of　general　science　independent　of　local　peculiarities；　that　it　may　be；　and　ought　to　be；　uniformly　regulated　throughout　the　country；　and　its　regulation　enforced　by　more　trained　and　skilful　hands　than　those　of　purely　local　authorities…　there　is　also　business；　such　as　the　administration　of　the　poor　laws；　sanitary　regulation；　and　others；　which；　while　really　interesting　to　the　whole　country；　cannot　consistently　with　the　very　purposes　of　local　administration；　be；　managed　otherwise　than　by　the　localities。　In　regard　to　such　duties　the　question　arises；　how　far　the　local　authorities　ought　to　be　trusted　with　discretionary　power；　free　from　any　superintendence　or　control　of　the　State。　　　To　decide　this　question　it　is　essential　to　consider　what　is　the　comparative　position　of　the　central　and　the　local　authorities　as　capacity　for　the　work；　and　security　against　negligence　or　abuse。　In　the　first　place；　the　local　representative　bodies　and　their　officers　are　almost　certain　to　be　of　a　much　lower　grade　of　intelligence　and　knowledge　than　Parliament　and　the　national　executive。　Secondly；　besides　being　themselves　of　inferior　qualifications；　they　are　watched　by；　and　accountable　to；　an　inferior　public　opinion。　The　public　under　whose　eyes　they　act；　and　by　whom　they　are　criticised；　is　both　more　limited　in　extent；　and　generally　far　less　enlightened；　than　that　which　surrounds　and　admonishes　the　highest　authorities　at　the　capital；　while　the　comparative　smallness　of　the　interests　involved　causes　even　that　inferior　public　to　direct　its　thoughts　to　the　subject　less　intently；　and　with　less　solicitude。　Far　less　interference　is　exercised　by　the　press　and　by　public　discussion；　and　that　which　is　exercised　may　with　much　more　impunity　be　disregarded　in　the　proceedings　of　local　than　in　those　of　national　authorities。　　　Thus　far　the　advantage　seems　wholly　on　the　side　of　management　by　the　central　government。　But；　when　we　look　more　closely；　these　motives　of　preference　are　found　to　be　balanced　by　others　fully　as　substantial。　If　the　local　authorities　and　public　are　inferior　to　the　central　ones　in　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　administration；　they　have　the　compensating　advantage　of　a　far　more　direct　interest　in　the　result。　A　man's　neighbours　or　his　landlord　may　be　much　cleverer　than　himself；　and　not　without　an　indirect　interest　in　his　prosperity；　but　for　all　that　his　interests　will　be　better　attended　to　in　his　own　keeping　than　in　theirs。　It　is　further　to　be　remembered；　that　even　supposing　the　central　government　to　administer　through　its　own　officers；　its　officers　do　not　act　at　the　centre；　but　in　the　locality：　and　however　inferior　the　local　public　may　be　to　the　central；　it　is　the　local　public　alone　which　has　any　opportunity　of　watching　them；　and　it　is　the　local　opinion　alone　which　either　acts　directly　upon　their　own　conduct；　or　calls　the　attention　of　the　government　to　the　points　in　which　they　may　require　correction。　It　is　but　in　extreme　cases　that　the　general　opinion　of　the　country　is　brought　to　bear　at　all　upon　details　of　local　administration；　and　still　more　rarely　has　it　the　means　of　deciding　upon　them　with　any　just　appreciation　of　the　case。　Now；　the　local　opinion　necessarily　acts　far　more　forcibly　upon　purely　local　administrators。　They；　in　the　natural　course　of　things；　are　permanent　residents；　not　expecting　to　be　withdrawn　from　the　place　when　they　cease　to　exercise　authority　in　it；　and　their　authority　itself　depends；　by　supposition；　on　the　will　of　the　local　public。　I　need　not　dwell　on　the　deficiencies　of　the　central　authority　in　detailed　knowledge　of　local　persons　and　things；　and　the　too　great　engrossment　of　its　time　and　thoughts　by　other　concerns；　to　admit　of　its　acquiring　the　quantity　and　quality　of　local　knowledge　necessary　even　for　deciding　on　complaints；　and　enforcing　responsibility　from　so　great　a　number　of　local　agents。　In　the　details　of　management；　therefore；　the　local　bodies　will　generally　have　the　advantage；　but　in　comprehension　of　the　principles　even　of　purely　local　management；　the　superiority　of　the　central　government；　when　rightly　constituted；　ought　to　be　prodigious：　not　only　by　reason　of　the　probably　great　personal　superiority　of　the　individuals　composing　it；　and　the　multitude　of　thinkers　and　writers　who　are　at　all　times　engaged　in　pressing　useful　ideas　upon　their　notice；　but　also　because　the　knowledge　and　experience　of　any　local　authority　is　but　local　knowledge　and　experience；　confined　to　their　own　part　of　the　country　and　its　modes　of　management；　whereas　the　central　government　has　the　means　of　knowing　all　that　is　to　be　learnt　from　the　united　experience　of　the　whole　kingdom；　with　the　addition　of　easy　access　to　that　of　foreign　countries。　　　The　practical　conclusion　from　these　premises　is　not　difficult　to　draw。　The　authority　which　is　most　conversant　with　principles　should　be　supreme　over　principles；　while　that　which　is　most　competent　in　details　should　have　the　details　left　to　it。　The　principal　business　of　the　central　authority　should　be　to　give　instruction；　of　the　local　authority　to　apply　it。　Power　may　be　localised；　but　knowledge；　to　be　most　useful；　must　be　centralised；　there　must　be　somewhere　a　focus　at　which　all　its　scattered　rays　are　collected；　that　the　broken　and　coloured　lights　which　exist　elsewhere　may　find　there　what　is　necessary　to　complete　and　purify　them。　To　every　branch　of　local　administration　which　affects　the　general　interest　there　should　be　a　corresponding　central　organ；　either　a　minister；　or　some　specially　appointed　functionary　under　him；　even　if　that　functionary　does　no　more　than　collect　information　from　all　quarters；　and　bring　the　experience　acquired　in　one　locality　to　the　knowledge　of　another　where　it　is　wanted。　But　there　is　also　something　more　than　this　for　the　central　authority　to　do。　It　ought　to　keep　open　a　perpetual　communication　with　the　localities：　informing　itself　by　their　experience；　and　them　by　its　own；　giving　advice　freely　when　asked；　volunteering　it　when　seen　to　be　required；　compelling　publicity　and　recordation　of　proceedings；　and　enforcing　obedience　to　every　general　law　which　the　legislature　has　laid　down　on　the　subject　of　local　management。　　　That　some　such　laws　ought　to　be　laid　down　few　are　likely　to　deny。　The　localities　may　be　allowed　to　mismanage　their　own　interests；　but　not　to　prejudice　those　of　others；　nor　violate　those　principles　of　justice　between　one　person　and　another　of　which　it　is　the　duty　of　the　State　to　maintain　the　rigid　observance。　If　the　local　majority　attempts　to　oppress　the　minority；　or　one　class　another；　the　State　is　bound　to　interpose。　For　example；　all　local　rates　ought　to　be　voted　exclusively　by　the　local　representative　body；　but　that　body；　though　elected　solely　by　rate…payers；　may　raise　its　revenues　by　imposts　of