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ether settled periods of their convening； or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative； or perhaps a mixture of both； hath the least inconvenience attending it； it is not my business here to inquire； but only to shew； that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the legislative； yet it is not thereby superior to it。 Sec。 157。 Things of this world are in so constant a flux； that nothing remains long in the same state。 Thus people； riches； trade； power； change their stations； flourishing mighty cities come to ruin； and prove in times neglected desolate corners； whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous countries； filled with wealth and inhabitants。 But things not always changing equally； and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges； when the reasons of them are ceased； it often comes to pass； that in governments； where part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people； that in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon。 To what gross absurdities the following of custom； when reason has left it； may lead； we may be satisfied； when we see the bare name of a town； of which there remains not so much as the ruins； where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote； or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found； sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law…makers； as a whole county numerous in people； and powerful in riches。 This strangers stand amazed at； and every one must confess needs a remedy； tho' most think it hard to find one； because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the society； antecedent to all positive laws in it； and depending wholly on the people； no inferior power can alter it。 And therefore the people； when the legislative is once constituted； having； in such a government as we have been speaking of； no power to act as long as the government stands； this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy。 Sec。 158。 Salus populi suprema lex； is certainly so just and fundamental a rule； that he； who sincerely follows it； cannot dangerously err。 If therefore the executive； who has the power of convoking the legislative； observing rather the true proportion； than fashion of representation； regulates； not by old custom； but true reason； the number of members； in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented； which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to； but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public； it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative； but to have restored the old and true one； and to have rectified the disorders which
succession of time had insensibly； as well as inevitably introduced： For it being the interest as well as intention of the people； to have a fair and equal representative； whoever brings it nearest to that； is an undoubted friend to； and establisher of the government； and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community； prerogative being nothing but a power； in the hands of the prince； to provide for the public good； in such cases； which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences； certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct； whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people； and the establishing the government upon its true foundations； is； and always will be； just prerogative； The power of erecting new corporations； and therewith new representatives； carries with it a supposition； that in time the measures of representation might vary； and those places have a just right to be represented which before had none； and by the same reason； those cease to have a right； and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege； which before had it。 'Tis not a change from the present state； which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced； that makes an inroad upon the government； but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people； and to set up one part or party； with a distinction from； and an unequal subjection of the rest。 Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society； and people in general； upon just and lasting measures； will always； when done； justify itself； and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures； suitable to the original frame of the government； it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society； whoever permitted or caused them so to do。
CHAP。 XIV。
Of PREROGATIVE。
Sec。 159。 WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands； （as they are in all moderated monarchies； and well…framed governments） there the good of the society requires； that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power： for the legislators not being able to foresee； and provide by laws； for all that may be useful to the community； the executor of the laws having the power in his hands； has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society； in many cases； where the municipal law has given no direction； till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it。 Many things there are； which the law can by no means provide for； and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands； to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require： nay； it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power； or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government； viz。 That as much as may be； all the members of the society are to be preserved： for since many accidents may happen； wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm； （as not to pull down an innocent man's house to stop the fire； when the next to it is burning） and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law； which makes no distinction of persons； by an action that may deserve reward and pardon； 'tis fit the ruler should have a power； in many cases； to mitigate the severity of the law； and pardon some offenders： for the end of government being the preservation of all； as much as may be； even the guilty are to be spared； where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent。 Sec。 160。 This power to act according to discretion； for the public good； without the prescription of the law； and
sometimes even against it； is that which is called prerogative： for since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being； and is usually too numerous； and so too slow； for the dispatch requisite to execution； and because also it is impossible to foresee； and so by laws to provide for； all accidents and necessities that may concern the public； or to make such laws as will do no harm； if they are executed with an inflexible rigour； on all occasions； and upon all persons that may come in their way； therefore there is a latitude left to the executive po