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dinate and accountable to it； and may be at pleasure changed and displaced； so that it is not the supreme executive power； that is exempt from subordination； but the supreme executive power vested in one； who having a share in the legislative； has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to； farther than he himself shall join and consent； so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit； which one may certainly conclude will be but very little。 Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth； we need not speak； they being so multiplied with infinite variety； in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths； that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all。 Only thus much； which is necessary to our present purpose； we may take notice of concerning them； that they have no manner of authority； any of them； beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them； and are all of them accountable to some other power in the common…wealth。 Sec。 153。 It is not necessary； no； nor so much as convenient； that the legislative should be always in being； but absolutely necessary that the executive power should； because there is not always need of new laws to be made； but always need of execution of the laws that are made。 When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws； they make； into other hands； they have a power still to resume it out of those hands； when they find cause； and to punish for any maladministration against the laws。 The same holds also in regard of the federative power； that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative； which； as has been shewed； in a constituted common…wealth is the supreme。 The legislative also in this case
being supposed to consist of several persons； （for if it be a single person； it cannot but be always in being； and so will； as supreme； naturally have the supreme executive power； together with the legislative） may assemble； and exercise their legislature； at the times that either their original constitution； or their own adjournment； appoints； or when they please； if neither of these hath appointed any time； or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them： for the supreme power being placed in them by the people； it is always in them； and they may exercise it when they please； unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons； or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time； and when that time comes； they have a right to assemble and act again。 Sec。 154。 If the legislative； or any part of it； be made up of representatives chosen for that time by the people； which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects； and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice； this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people； either at certain appointed seasons； or else when they are summoned to it； and in this latter case ' the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive； and has one of these two limitations in respect of time： that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals； and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling； according to due forms； or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections； when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old； or making of new laws； or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies； that lie on； or threaten the people。 Sec。 155。 It may be demanded here； What if the executive power； being possessed of the force of the common…wealth； shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative； when the original constitution； or the public exigencies require it？ I say； using force upon the people without authority； and contrary to the trust put in him that does so； is a state of war with the people； who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power： for having erected a legislative； with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws； either at certain set times； or when there is need of it； when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society； and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists； the people have a right to remove it by force。 In all states and conditions； the true remedy of force without authority； is to oppose force to it。 The use of force without authority； always puts him that uses it into a state of war； as the aggressor； and renders him liable to be treated accordingly。 Sec。 156。 The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative； placed in the executive； gives not the executive a superiority over it； but is a fiduciary trust placed in him； for the safety of the people； in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule： for it not being possible； that the first framers of the government should； by any foresight； be so much masters of future events； as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislative； in all times to come； that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the common… wealth； the best remedy could be found for this defect； was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present； and whose business it was to watch over the public good。 Constant frequent meetings of the legislative； and long continuations of their assemblies； without necessary occasion； could not but be burdensome to the people； and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies； and yet the quick
turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help： any delay of their convening might endanger the public； and sometimes too their business might be so great； that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work； and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation。 What then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard； on one side or the other； by fixed intervals and periods； set to the meeting and acting of the legislative； but to intrust it to the prudence of some； who being present； and acquainted with the state of public affairs； might make use of this prerogative for the public good？ and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands； who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end？ Thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative； not settled by the original constitution； it naturally fell into the hands of the executive； not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure； but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal； as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require。 Whether settled periods of their convening； or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legisla