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the contradictory of the above hypothesis （of different parts of
Soul remaining engaged in simultaneous perception with one sense） is
what emerges from the analogy＇； while if the two parts of Soul
remain separate； the analogy of the eyes will fail； ＇for of these some
one is really formed＇。
Furthermore； ＇on the supposition of the need of different parts of
Soul； co…operating in each sense； to discern different objects
coinstantaneously＇； the senses will be each at the same time one and
many； as if we should say that they were each a set of diverse
sciences； for neither will an 'activity' exist without its proper
faculty； nor without activity will there be sensation。
But if the Soul does not； in the way suggested ＇i。e。 with
different parts of itself acting simultaneously＇； perceive in one
and the same individual time sensibles of the same sense； a fortiori
it is not thus that it perceives sensibles of different senses。 For it
is； as already stated； more conceivable that it should perceive a
plurality of the former together in this way than a plurality of
heterogeneous objects。
If then； as is the fact； the Soul with one part perceives Sweet；
with another； White； either that which results from these is some
one part； or else there is no such one resultant。 But there must be
such an one； inasmuch as the general faculty of sense…perception is
one。 What one object； then； does that one faculty ＇when perceiving
an object； e。g。 as both White and Sweet＇ perceive？ ＇None＇； for
assuredly no one object arises by composition of these
＇heterogeneous objects； such as White and Sweet＇。 We must conclude；
therefore； that there is； as has been stated before； some one
faculty in the soul with which the latter perceives all its
percepts； though it perceives each different genus of sensibles
through a different organ。
May we not； then； conceive this faculty which perceives White and
Sweet to be one qua indivisible ＇sc。 qua combining its different
simultaneous objects＇ in its actualization； but different； when it has
become divisible ＇sc。 qua distinguishing its different simultaneous
objects＇ in its actualization？
Or is what occurs in the case of the perceiving Soul conceivably
analogous to what holds true in that of the things themselves？ For the
same numerically one thing is white and sweet； and has many other
qualities； ＇while its numerical oneness is not thereby prejudiced＇
if the fact is not that the qualities are really separable in the
object from one another； but that the being of each quality is
different ＇from that of every other＇。 In the same way therefore we
must assume also； in the case of the Soul； that the faculty of
perception in general is in itself numerically one and the same； but
different ＇differentiated＇ in its being； different； that is to say； in
genus as regards some of its objects； in species as regards others。
Hence too； we may conclude that one can perceive ＇numerically
different objects＇ coinstantaneously with a faculty which is
numerically one and the same； but not the same in its relationship
＇sc。 according as the objects to which it is directed are not the
same＇。
That every sensible object is a magnitude； and that nothing which it
is possible to perceive is indivisible； may be thus shown。 The
distance whence an object could not be seen is indeterminate； but that
whence it is visible is determinate。 We may say the same of the
objects of Smelling and Hearing； and of all sensibles not discerned by
actual contact。 Now； there is； in the interval of distance； some
extreme place； the last from which the object is invisible； and the
first from which it is visible。 This place； beyond which if the object
be one cannot perceive it； while if the object be on the hither side
one must perceive it； is； I presume； itself necessarily indivisible。
Therefore； if any sensible object be indivisible； such object； if
set in the said extreme place whence imperceptibility ends and
perceptibility begins； will have to be both visible and invisible
their objects； whether regarded in general or at the same time； but
this is impossible。
This concludes our survey of the characteristics of the organs of
Sense…perception and their objects； whether regarded in general or
in relation to each organ。 Of the remaining subjects； we must first
consider that of memory and remembering。
…THE END…
。