按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
must conclude that it is impossible to discern them coinstantaneously。
It is likewise clearly impossible so to discern such homogeneous
sensibles as are not ＇indeed＇ Contrary； ＇but are yet of different
species＇。 For these are； ＇in the sphere of colour； for instance＇；
classed some with White； others with Black； and so it is； likewise； in
the other provinces of sense； for example； of savours； some are
classed with Sweet； and others with Bitter。 Nor can one discern the
components in compounds coinstantaneously （for these are ratios of
Contraries； as e。g。 the Octave or the Fifth）； unless； indeed； on
condition of perceiving them as one。 For thus； and not otherwise；
the ratios of the extreme sounds are compounded into one ratio：
since we should have together the ratio； on the one hand； of Many to
Few or of Odd to Even； on the other； that of Few to Many or of Even to
Odd ＇and these； to be perceived together； must be unified＇。
If； then； the sensibles denominated co…ordinates though in different
provinces of sense （e。g。 I call Sweet and White co…ordinates though in
different provinces） stand yet more aloof； and differ more； from one
another than do any sensibles in the same province； while Sweet
differs from White even more than Black does from White； it is still
less conceivable that one should discern them ＇viz。 sensibles in
different sensory provinces whether co…ordinates or not＇
coinstantaneously than sensibles which are in the same province。
Therefore； if coinstantaneous perception of the latter be
impossible； that of the former is a fortiori impossible。
Some of the writers who treat of concords assert that the sounds
combined in these do not reach us simultaneously； but only appear to
do so； their real successiveness being unnoticed whenever the time
it involves is ＇so small as to be＇ imperceptible。 Is this true or not？
One might perhaps； following this up； go so far as to say that even
the current opinion that one sees and hears coinstantaneously is due
merely to the fact that the intervals of time ＇between the really
successive perceptions of sight and hearing＇ escape observation。 But
this can scarcely be true； nor is it conceivable that any portion of
time should be ＇absolutely＇ imperceptible； or that any should be
absolutely unnoticeable； the truth being that it is possible to
perceive every instant of time。 ＇This is so＇； because； if it is
inconceivable that a person should； while perceiving himself or
aught else in a continuous time； be at any instant unaware of his
own existence； while； obviously； the assumption； that there is in
the time…continuum a time so small as to be absolutely
imperceptible； carries the implication that a person would； during
such time； be unaware of his own existence； as well as of his seeing
and perceiving； ＇this assumption must be false＇。
Again； if there is any magnitude； whether time or thing；
absolutely imperceptible owing to its smallness； it follows that there
would not be either a thing which one perceives； or a time in which
one perceives it； unless in the sense that in some part of the given
time he sees some part of the given thing。 For ＇let there be a line
ab； divided into two parts at g； and let this line represent a whole
object and a corresponding whole time。 Now；＇ if one sees the whole
line； and perceives it during a time which forms one and the same
continuum； only in the sense that he does so in some portion of this
time； let us suppose the part gb； representing a time in which by
supposition he was perceiving nothing； cut off from the whole。 Well；
then； he perceives in a certain part ＇viz。 in the remainder＇ of the
time； or perceives a part ＇viz。 the remainder＇ of the line； after
the fashion in which one sees the whole earth by seeing some given
part of it； or walks in a year by walking in some given part of the
year。 But ＇by hypothesis＇ in the part bg he perceives nothing：
therefore； in fact； he is said to perceive the whole object and during
the whole time simply because he perceives ＇some part of the object＇
in some part of the time ab。 But the same argument holds also in the
case of ag ＇the remainder； regarded in its turn as a whole＇； for it
will be found ＇on this theory of vacant times and imperceptible
magnitudes＇ that one always perceives only in some part of a given
whole time； and perceives only some part of a whole magnitude； and
that it is impossible to perceive any ＇really＇ whole ＇object in a
really whole time； a conclusion which is absurd； as it would logically
annihilate the perception of both Objects and Time＇。
Therefore we must conclude that all magnitudes are perceptible；
but their actual dimensions do not present themselves immediately in
their presentation as objects。 One sees the sun； or a four…cubit rod
at a distance； as a magnitude； but their exact dimensions are not
given in their visual presentation： nay； at times an object of sight
appears indivisible； but ＇vision like other special senses； is
fallible respecting 'common sensibles'； e。g。 magnitude； and＇ nothing
that one sees is really indivisible。 The reason of this has been
previously explained。 It is clear then； from the above arguments； that
no portion of time is imperceptible。
But we must here return to the question proposed above for
discussion； whether it is possible or impossible to perceive several
objects coinstantaneously； by 'coinstantaneously' I mean perceiving
the several objects in a time one and indivisible relatively to one
another； i。e。 indivisible in a sense consistent with its being all a
continuum。
First； then； is it conceivable that one should perceive the
different things coinstantaneously； but each with a different part
of the Soul？ Or ＇must we object＇ that； in the first place； to begin
with the objects of one and the same sense； e。g。 Sight； if we assume
it ＇the Soul qua exercising Sight＇ to perceive one colour with one
part； and another colour with a different part； it will have a
plurality of parts the same in species； ＇as they must be；＇ since the
objects which it thus perceives fall within the same genus？
Should any one ＇to illustrate how the Soul might have in it two
different parts specifically identical； each directed to a set of
aistheta the same in genus with that to which the other is directed＇
urge that； as there are two eyes； so there may be in the Soul
something analogous； ＇the reply is＇ that of the eyes； doubtless；
some one organ is formed； and hence their actualization in
perception is one； but if this is so in the Soul； then； in so far as
what is formed of both ＇i。e。 of any two specifically identical parts
as assumed＇ is one； the true perceiving subject also will be one； ＇and
the contradictory of the above hypothesis （of different parts of
Soul remainin