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dispositions are visible； we can make for him in one body；
whereas； our own dispositions being kept secret； the enemy will
be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack
from every quarter。〃＇
14。 We can form a single united body； while the enemy must
split up into fractions。 Hence there will be a whole pitted
against separate parts of a whole； which means that we shall be
many to the enemy's few。
15。 And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one； our opponents will be in dire straits。
16。 The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
known； for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible
attack at several different points；
＇Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's
victories by saying that 〃while his opponents were kept fully
employed wondering what he was going to do； HE was thinking most
of what he was going to do himself。〃＇
and his forces being thus distributed in many directions； the
numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be
proportionately few。
17。 For should the enemy strengthen his van； he will weaken
his rear； should he strengthen his rear； he will weaken his van；
should he strengthen his left； he will weaken his right； should
he strengthen his right； he will weaken his left。 If he sends
reinforcements everywhere； he will everywhere be weak。
＇In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we
read： 〃A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent
detachment。 Those generals who have had but little experience
attempt to protect every point； while those who are better
acquainted with their profession； having only the capital object
in view； guard against a decisive blow； and acquiesce in small
misfortunes to avoid greater。〃＇
18。 Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against
possible attacks； numerical strength； from compelling our
adversary to make these preparations against us。
＇The highest generalship； in Col。 Henderson's words； is 〃to
compel the enemy to disperse his army； and then to concentrate
superior force against each fraction in turn。〃＇
19。 Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle； we
may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight。
＇What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation
of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which
enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and
rapid march； and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the
right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in
overwhelming strength。 Among many such successful junctions
which military history records； one of the most dramatic and
decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical
moment on the field of Waterloo。＇
20。 But if neither time nor place be known； then the left
wing will be impotent to succor the right； the right equally
impotent to succor the left； the van unable to relieve the rear；
or the rear to support the van。 How much more so if the furthest
portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart； and
even the nearest are separated by several LI！
＇The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in
precision； but the mental picture we are required to draw is
probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in
separate columns； each of which has orders to be there on a fixed
date。 If the general allows the various detachments to proceed
at haphazard； without precise instructions as to the time and
place of meeting； the enemy will be able to annihilate the army
in detail。 Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here： 〃If we do
not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the
day on which they will join battle； our unity will be forfeited
through our preparations for defense； and the positions we hold
will be insecure。 Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe； we
shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition； and no mutual
support will be possible between wings； vanguard or rear；
especially if there is any great distance between the foremost
and hindmost divisions of the army。〃＇
21。 Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh
exceed our own in number； that shall advantage them nothing in
the matter of victory。 I say then that victory can be achieved。
＇Alas for these brave words！ The long feud between the two
states ended in 473 B。C。 with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien
and its incorporation in Yueh。 This was doubtless long after Sun
Tzu's death。 With his present assertion compare IV。 ss。 4。
Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy；
which he thus goes on to explain： 〃In the chapter on Tactical
Dispositions it is said； 'One may KNOW how to conquer without
being able to DO it；' whereas here we have the statement that
'victory' can be achieved。' The explanation is； that in the
former chapter； where the offensive and defensive are under
discussion； it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared； one
cannot make certain of beating him。 But the present passage
refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who； according to Sun
Tzu's calculations； will be kept in ignorance of the time and
place of the impending struggle。 That is why he says here that
victory can be achieved。〃＇
22。 Though the enemy be stronger in numbers； we may prevent
him from fighting。 Scheme so as to discover his plans and the
likelihood of their success。
＇An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is： 〃Know
beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's
failure。〃
23。 Rouse him； and learn the principle of his activity or
inactivity。
＇Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by
the enemy on being thus disturbed； we shall be able to conclude
whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse。 He instances
the action of Cho…ku Liang； who sent the scornful present of a
woman's head…dress to Ssu…ma I； in order to goad him out of his
Fabian tactics。＇
Force him to reveal himself； so as to find out his vulnerable
spots。
24。 Carefully compare the opposing army with your own； so
that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is
deficient。
＇Cf。 IV。 ss。 6。＇
25。 In making tactical dispositions； the highest pitch you
can attain is to conceal them；
＇The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation。
Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility （see supra
ss。 9） as 〃showing no sign〃 of what you mean to do； of the plans
that are formed in your brain。＇
conceal your dispositions； and you will be safe from the prying
of the subtlest spies； from the machinations of the wise