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a particular object； as a form of representation in general； in so far
as it may be termed cognition； for in and by cognition alone do I
think anything。
It must； however； appear extraordinary at first sight that the
condition under which I think； and which is consequently a property of
my subject； should be held to be likewise valid for every existence
which thinks； and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly
empirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal；
to wit； that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of my
consciousness declares it to be； that is； as a self…conscious being。
The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we
necessarily attribute to things a priori all the properties which
constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them。 Now I
cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means of
external experience； but solely through self…consciousness。 Such
objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this
consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be
represented as thinking beings。 The proposition； 〃I think；〃 is； in the
present case； understood in a problematical sense； not in so far as it
contains a perception of an existence （like the Cartesian 〃Cogito；
ergo sum〃）；* but in regard to its mere possibility… for the purpose of
discovering what properties may be inferred from so simple a
proposition and predicated of the subject of it。
*＇〃I think； therefore I am。〃＇
If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking
beings there lay more than the mere Cogito… if we could likewise
call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts； and the thence
derived natural laws of the thinking self； there would arise an
empirical psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the
internal sense and might possibly be capable of explaining the
phenomena of that sense。 But it could never be available for
discovering those properties which do not belong to possible
experience （such as the quality of simplicity）； nor could it make
any apodeictic enunciation on the nature of thinking beings： it
would therefore not be a rational psychology。
Now； as the proposition 〃I think〃 （in the problematical sense）
contains the form of every judgement in general and is the constant
accompaniment of all the categories； it is manifest that conclusions
are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the
understanding。 This use of the understanding excludes all empirical
elements； and we cannot； as has been shown above； have any
favourable conception beforehand of its procedure。 We shall
therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all
the predicaments of pure psychology； but we shall； for brevity's sake；
allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connection。
Before entering on this task； however； the following general
remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument。
It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object； but
only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity
of consciousness in which all thinking consists。 It follows that I
cognize myself； not through my being conscious of myself as
thinking； but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as
determined in relation to the function of thought。 All the modi of
self…consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects
（conceptions of the understanding… categories）； they are mere
logical functions； which do not present to thought an object to be
cognized； and cannot therefore present my Self as an object。 Not the
consciousness of the determining； but only that of the determinable
self； that is； of my internal intuition （in so far as the manifold
contained in it can be connected conformably with the general
condition of the unity of apperception in thought）； is the object。
1。 In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation
which constitutes a judgement。 But that the I which thinks； must be
considered as in thought always a subject； and as a thing which cannot
be a predicate to thought； is an apodeictic and identical proposition。
But this proposition does not signify that I； as an object； am； for
myself； a self…subsistent being or substance。 This latter statement…
an ambitious one… requires to be supported by data which are not to be
discovered in thought； and are perhaps （in so far as I consider the
thinking self merely as such） not to be discovered in the thinking
self at all。
2。 That the I or Ego of apperception； and consequently in all
thought； is singular or simple； an；3 cannot be resolved into a
plurality of subjects； and therefore indicates a logically simple
subject… this is self…evident from the very conception of an Ego；
and is consequently an analytical proposition。 But this is not
tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance…
for this would be a synthetical proposition。 The conception of
substance always relates to intuitions； which with me cannot be
other than sensuous； and which consequently lie completely out of
the sphere of the understanding and its thought： but to this sphere
belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought。 It would
indeed be surprising； if the conception of 〃substance；〃 which in other
cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements
presented by intuition… so much trouble； too； to discover whether it
can be simple （as in the case of the parts of matter）… should be
presented immediately to me； as if by revelation； in the poorest
mental representation of all。
3。 The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the
manifold representations of which I am conscious； is likewise a
proposition lying in the conceptions themselves； and is consequently
analytical。 But this identity of the subject； of which I am
conscious in all its representations； does not relate to or concern
the intuition of the subject； by which it is given as an object。
This proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the
person； by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of
its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of
circumstances。 To prove this； we should require not a mere analysis of
the proposition； but synthetical judgements based upon a given
intuition。
4。 I distinguish my own existence； as that of a thinking being； from
that of other things external to me… among which my body also is
reckoned。 This is also an analytical proposition； for other things are
exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself。
But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things
external to me； and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking
being （without being man）… cannot be known or inferred from this
proposition。
Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as
o