按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
necessarily arise from the character of human nature； but rather
from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation。 For there is
nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher； than the
vulgar appeal to a so…called adverse experience； which indeed would
not have existed； if those institutions had been established at the
proper time and in accordance with ideas； while； instead of this；
conceptions； crude for the very reason that they have been drawn
from experience； have marred and frustrated all our better views and
intentions。 The more legislation and government are in harmony with
this idea； the more rare do punishments become and thus it is quite
reasonable to maintain； as Plato did； that in a perfect state no
punishments at all would be necessary。 Now although a perfect state
may never exist； the idea is not on that account the less just；
which holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a
constitution； in order to bring legislative government always nearer
and nearer to the greatest possible perfection。 For at what precise
degree human nature must stop in its progress； and how wide must be
the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its
realization； are problems which no one can or ought to determine…
and for this reason； that it is the destination of freedom to overstep
all assigned limits between itself and the idea。
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and
where ideas are operative causes （of actions and their objects）；
that is to say； in the region of ethics； but also in regard to
nature herself； Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas。 A
plant； and animal； the regular order of nature… probably also the
disposition of the whole universe… give manifest evidence that they
are possible only by means of and according to ideas； that； indeed； no
one creature； under the individual conditions of its existence；
perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind…
just as little as man with the idea of humanity； which nevertheless he
bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions； that；
notwithstanding； these ideas are in the highest sense individually；
unchangeably； and completely determined； and are the original causes
of things； and that the totality of connected objects in the
universe is alone fully adequate to that idea。 Setting aside the
exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher； the
mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of
regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof
according to ends； that is； ideas； is an effort which deserves
imitation and claims respect。 But as regards the principles of ethics；
of legislation； and of religion； spheres in which ideas alone render
experience possible； although they never attain to full expression
therein； he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit；
which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very
empirical rules； the validity of which as principles is destroyed by
ideas。 For as regards nature； experience presents us with rules and is
the source of truth； but in relation to ethical laws experience is the
parent of illusion； and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to
limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do； from
what is done。
We must； however； omit the consideration of these important
subjects； the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and
dignity of philosophy； and confine ourselves for the present to the
more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation
for those majestic edifices of moral science。 For this foundation
has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which
reason in its confident but vain search for treasures has made in
all directions。 Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly
acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason； its
principles and ideas； that we may be able properly to determine and
value its influence and real worth。 But before bringing these
introductory remarks to a close； I beg those who really have
philosophy at heart… and their number is but small… if they shall find
themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by
those above； to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea
its original signification； and to take care that it be not lost among
those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are
loosely designated… that the interests of science may not thereby
suffer。 We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode
of representation； without the necessity of encroaching upon terms
which are proper to others。 The following is a graduated list of them。
The genus is representation in general （representation。 Under it
stands representation with consciousness （perceptio）。 A perception
which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state； is
a sensation （sensatio）； an objective perception is a cognition
（cognitio）。 A cognition is either an intuition or a conception
（intuitus vel conceptus）。 The former has an immediate relation to
the object and is singular and individual； the latter has but a
mediate relation； by means of a characteristic mark which may be
common to several things。 A conception is either empirical or pure。
A pure conception； in so far as it has its origin in the understanding
alone； and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image； is called
notio。 A conception formed from notions； which transcends the
possibility of experience； is an idea； or a conception of reason。 To
one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions； it must be quite
intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an
idea。 It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of
understanding。
SECTION II。 Of Transcendental Ideas。
Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our
cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori；
conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience； or
rather； indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an
empirical cognition of objects。 The form of judgements… converted into
a conception of the synthesis of intuitions… produced the categories
which direct the employment of the understanding in experience。 This
consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms；
when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions； following the rule of
the categories； will contain the origin of particular a priori
conceptions； which we may call pure conceptions of reason or
transcendental ideas； and which will determine the use of the
understanding in the totality of experience according to principles。
The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality
of a cognition according to conceptions； and the syllogism itself is a
judgement which is determined a priori