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birthplace； and analysing the pure use of this faculty。 For this is
the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy； what remains is the
logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general。 We
shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and
beginnings in the human understanding； in which they lie； until they
are developed on occasions presented by experience； and； freed by
the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to
them； are set forth in their unalloyed purity。
CHAPTER I。 Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
Conceptions of the Understanding。
Introductory。 SS 3
When we call into play a faculty of cognition； different conceptions
manifest themselves according to the different circumstances； and make
known this faculty； and assemble themselves into a more or less
extensive collection； according to the time or penetration that has
been applied to the consideration of them。 Where this process；
conducted as it is mechanically； so to speak； will end； cannot be
determined with certainty。 Besides； the conceptions which we
discover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in
order and systematic unity； but are at last coupled together only
according to resemblances to each other； and arranged in series；
according to the quantity of their content； from the simpler to the
more complex… series which are anything but systematic； though not
altogether without a certain kind of method in their construction。
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage； and moreover the
duty； of searching for its conceptions according to a principle；
because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the
understanding as an absolute unity； and therefore must be connected
with each other according to one conception or idea。 A connection of
this kind； however； furnishes us with a ready prepared rule； by
which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the
understanding； and the completeness of the system of all be determined
a priori… both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere
choice or chance。
SECTION 1。 Of defined above Use of understanding in General。 SS 4
The understanding was defined above only negatively； as a
non…sensuous faculty of cognition。 Now； independently of
sensibility； we cannot possibly have any intuition； consequently；
the understanding is no faculty of intuition。 But besides intuition
there is no other mode of cognition； except through conceptions；
consequently； the cognition of every； at least of every human；
understanding is a cognition through conceptions… not intuitive； but
discursive。 All intuitions； as sensuous； depend on affections；
conceptions； therefore； upon functions。 By the word function I
understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations
under one common representation。 Conceptions； then； are based on the
spontaneity of thought； as sensuous intuitions are on the
receptivity of impressions。 Now； the understanding cannot make any
other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them。 As no
representation； except an intuition； relates immediately to its
object； a conception never relates immediately to an object； but
only to some other representation thereof； be that an intuition or
itself a conception。 A judgement； therefore； is the mediate
cognition of an object； consequently the representation of a
representation of it。 In every judgement there is a conception which
applies to； and is valid for many other conceptions； and which among
these comprehends also a given representation； this last being
immediately connected with an object。 For example； in the judgement…
〃All bodies are divisible；〃 our conception of divisible applies to
various other conceptions； among these； however； it is here
particularly applied to the conception of body； and this conception of
body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us。 These objects；
therefore； are mediately represented by the conception of
divisibility。 All judgements； accordingly； are functions of unity in
our representations； inasmuch as； instead of an immediate； a higher
representation； which comprises this and various others； is used for
our cognition of the object； and thereby many possible cognitions
are collected into one。 But we can reduce all acts of the
understanding to judgements； so that understanding may be
represented as the faculty of judging。 For it is； according to what
has been said above； a faculty of thought。 Now thought is cognition by
means of conceptions。 But conceptions； as predicates of possible
judgements； relate to some representation of a yet undetermined
object。 Thus the conception of body indicates something… for
example； metal… which can be cognized by means of that conception。
It is therefore a conception； for the reason alone that other
representations are contained under it； by means of which it can
relate to objects。 It is therefore the predicate to a possible
judgement； for example： 〃Every metal is a body。〃 All the functions
of the understanding therefore can be discovered； when we can
completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements。 And that this
may be effected very easily； the following section will show。
SECTION II。 Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
Judgements。 SS 5
If we abstract all the content of a judgement； and consider only the
intellectual form thereof； we find that the function of thought in a
judgement can be brought under four heads； of which each contains
three momenta。 These may be conveniently represented in the
following table：
1
Quantity of judgements
Universal
Particular
Singular
2 3
Quality Relation
Affirmative Categorical
Negative Hypothetical
Infinite Disjunctive
4
Modality
Problematical
Assertorical
Apodeictical
As this division appears to differ in some； though not essential
points； from the usual technique of logicians； the following
observations； for the prevention of otherwise possible
misunderstanding； will not be without their use。
1。 Logicians say； with justice； that in the use of judgements in
syllogisms； singular judgements may be treated like universal ones。
For； precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all；
its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the
conception of the subject an