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recourse to intuition； as； in fact； geometry always does。 You
therefore give yourself an object in intuition。 But of what kind is
this intuition？ Is it a pure a priori； or is it an empirical
intuition？ If the latter； then neither an universally valid； much less
an apodeictic proposition can arise from it； for experience never
can give us any such proposition。 You must； therefore； give yourself
an object a priori in intuition； and upon that ground your synthetical
proposition。 Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of
intuition a priori； if this subjective condition were not in respect
to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone
the object of this external intuition is itself possible； if the
object （that is； the triangle） were something in itself； without
relation to you the subject； how could you affirm that that which lies
necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a
triangle； must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself？
For to your conceptions of three lines； you could not add anything new
（that is； the figure）； which； therefore； must necessarily be found
in the object； because the object is given before your cognition；
and not by means of it。 If； therefore； space （and time also） were
not a mere form of your intuition； which contains conditions a priori；
under which alone things can become external objects for you； and
without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves
nothing； you could not construct any synthetical proposition
whatsoever regarding external objects。 It is therefore not merely
possible or probable； but indubitably certain； that space and time； as
the necessary conditions of all our external and internal
experience； are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions； in
relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena； and not
things in themselves； presented to us in this particular manner。 And
for this reason； in respect to the form of phenomena； much may be said
a priori； whilst of the thing in itself； which may lie at the
foundation of these phenomena； it is impossible to say anything。
II。 In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external
as well as internal sense； consequently of all objects of sense； as
mere phenomena； we may especially remark that all in our cognition
that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations。
（The feelings of pain and pleasure； and the will； which are not
cognitions； are excepted。） The relations； to wit； of place in an
intuition （extension）； change of place （motion）； and laws according to
which this change is determined （moving forces）。 That； however；
which is present in this or that place； or any operation going on；
or result taking place in the things themselves； with the exception of
change of place； is not given to us by intuition。 Now by means of mere
relations； a thing cannot be known in itself； and it may therefore
be fairly concluded； that； as through the external sense nothing but
mere representations of relations are given us； the said external
sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the
object to the subject； but not the essential nature of the object as a
thing in itself。
The same is the case with the internal intuition； not only
because； in the internal intuition； the representation of the external
senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied； but
because time； in which we place； and which itself antecedes the
consciousness of； these representations in experience； and which； as
the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed
in the mind； lies at the foundation of them； contains relations of the
successive； the coexistent； and of that which always must be
coexistent with succession； the permanent。 Now that which； as
representation； can antecede every exercise of thought （of an object）；
is intuition； and when it contains nothing but relations； it is the
form of the intuition； which； as it presents us with no
representation； except in so far as something is placed in the mind；
can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its
own activity； to wit… its presenting to itself representations；
consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself； that
is； it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form。
Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far
phenomenal； consequently； we must either refuse altogether to admit an
internal sense； or the subject； which is the object of that sense；
could only be represented by it as phenomenon； and not as it would
judge of itself； if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity； that
is； were intellectual。 The difficulty here lies wholly in the
question： How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself？
But this difficulty is common to every theory。 The consciousness of
self （apperception） is the simple representation of the 〃ego〃； and
if by means of that representation alone； all the manifold
representations in the subject were spontaneously given； then our
internal intuition would be intellectual。 This consciousness in man
requires an internal perception of the manifold representations
which are previously given in the subject； and the manner in which
these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity； must；
on account of this difference （the want of spontaneity）； be called
sensibility。 If the faculty of self…consciousness is to apprehend what
lies in the mind； it must all act that and can in this way alone
produce an intuition of self。 But the form of this intuition； which
lies in the original constitution of the mind； determines； in the
representation of time； the manner in which the manifold
representations are to combine themselves in the mind； since the
subject intuites itself； not as it would represent itself
immediately and spontaneously； but according to the manner in which
the mind is internally affected； consequently； as it appears； and
not as it is。
III。 When we say that the intuition of external objects； and also
the self…intuition of the subject； represent both； objects and
subject； in space and time； as they affect our senses； that is； as
they appear… this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these
objects are mere illusory appearances。 For when we speak of things
as phenomena； the objects； nay； even the properties which we ascribe
to them； are looked upon as really given； only that； in so far as this
or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject； in
the relation of the given object to the subject； the object as
phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in
itself。 Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to
me； or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self…consciousness；
although I maintain that the properties of space and time； in
conformity to which I set both； as