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hence he believed he could infer that； without experience； we
possess no source from which we can augment a conception； and no
ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to
extend our cognition a priori。 That the light of the sun； which shines
upon a piece of wax； at the same time melts it； while it hardens clay；
no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which
we previously possessed of these substances； much less is there any
a priori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion； which
experience alone can certify。 On the other hand； we have seen in our
discussion of transcendental logic； that； although we can never
proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which is
given us； we can always cognize completely a priori… in relation；
however； to a third term； namely； possible experience… the law of
its connection with other things。 For example； if I observe that a
piece of wax melts； I can cognize a priori that there must have been
something （the sun's heat） preceding； which this law； although；
without the aid of experience； I could not cognize a priori and in a
determinate manner either the cause from the effect； or the effect
from the cause。 Hume was； therefore； wrong in inferring； from the
contingency of the determination according to law； the contingency
of the law itself； and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to
possible experience （which is an a priori proceeding； constituting the
objective reality of the conception）； he confounded with our synthesis
of objects in actual experience； which is always； of course；
empirical。 Thus； too； he regarded the principle of affinity； which has
its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection； as
a mere rule of association； lying in the imitative faculty of
imagination； which can present only contingent； and not objective
connections。
The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose
principally from a defect； which was common to him with the
dogmatists； namely； that he had never made a systematic review of
all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the
understanding。 Had he done so； he would have found； to take one
example among many； that the principle of permanence was of this
character； and that it； as well as the principle of causality；
anticipates experience。 In this way he might have been able to
describe the determinate limits of the a priori operations of
understanding and reason。 But he merely declared the understanding
to be limited； instead of showing what its limits were； he created a
general mistrust in the power of our faculties； without giving us
any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and
unavoidable ignorance； he examined and condemned some of the
principles of the understanding； without investigating all its
powers with the completeness necessary to criticism。 He denies； with
truth； certain powers to the understanding； but he goes further； and
declares it to be utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of
knowledge； although he has not fully examined all the powers which
reside in the faculty； and thus the fate which always overtakes
scepticism meets him too。 That is to say； his own declarations are
doubted； for his objections were based upon facta； which are
contingent； and not upon principles； which can alone demonstrate the
necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions。
As Hume makes no distinction between the well…grounded claims of the
understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason； against
which； however； his attacks are mainly directed； reason does not
feel itself shut out from all attempts at the extension of a priori
cognition； and hence it refuses； in spite of a few checks in this or
that quarter； to relinquish such efforts。 For one naturally arms
oneself to resist an attack； and becomes more obstinate in the resolve
to establish the claims he has advanced。 But a complete review of
the powers of reason； and the conviction thence arising that we are in
possession of a limited field of action； while we must admit the
vanity of higher claims； puts an end to all doubt and dispute； and
induces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of
its limited domain。
To the uncritical dogmatist； who has not surveyed the sphere of
his understanding； nor determined； in accordance with principles；
the limits of possible cognition； who； consequently； is ignorant of
his own powers； and believes he will discover them by the attempts
he makes in the field of cognition； these attacks of scepticism are
not only dangerous； but destructive。 For if there is one proposition
in his chain of reasoning which be he cannot prove； or the fallacy
in which be cannot evolve in accordance with a principle； suspicion
falls on all his statements； however plausible they may appear。
And thus scepticism； the bane of dogmatical philosophy； conducts
us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason。
When we are thus far advanced； we need fear no further
attacks； for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out； and we
can make no claims nor become involved in any disputes regarding the
region that lies beyond these limits。 Thus the sceptical procedure
in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason；
but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers； awakening its
circumspection； and indicating the means whereby it may most fully
establish its claims to its legitimate possessions。
SECTION III。 The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis。
This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to
extend the bounds of knowledge； by means of pure speculation； are
utterly fruitless。 So much the wider field； it may appear； lies open
to hypothesis； as； where we cannot know with certainty； we are at
liberty to make guesses and to form suppositions。
Imagination may be allowed； under the strict surveillance of reason；
to invent suppositions； but； these must be based on something that
is perfectly certain… and that is the possibility of the object。 If we
are well assured upon this point； it is allowable to have recourse
to supposition in regard to the reality of the object； but this
supposition must； unless it is utterly groundless； be connected； as
its ground of explanation； with that which is really given and
absolutely certain。 Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis。
It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of
the possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena； and the category
of the pure understanding will not enable us to ex。 cogitate any
such connection； but merely helps us to understand it； when we meet
with it in experience。 For this reason we cannot； in accordance with
the categories； imagine or invent any object or any property of an
object not given； or that may not be given in experience； and employ
it in a hypothesis； otherwise； we sho