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the conception of the predicate； will not help you out of the
difficulty。 For； supposing you were to term all positing of a thing
reality； you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in
the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence； and
this you merely repeat in the predicate。 But if you confess； as
every reasonable person must； that every existential proposition is
synthetical； how can it be maintained that the predicate of
existence cannot be denied without contradiction？… a property which is
the characteristic of analytical propositions； alone。
I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this
sophistical mode of argumentation； by a strict definition of the
conception of existence； did not my own experience teach me that the
illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real
predicate （a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing）
resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration。 A
logical predicate may be what you please； even the subject may be
predicated of itself； for logic pays no regard to the content of a
judgement。 But the determination of a conception is a predicate； which
adds to and enlarges the conception。 It must not； therefore； be
contained in the conception。
Being is evidently not a real predicate； that is； a conception of
something which is added to the conception of some other thing。 It
is merely the positing of a thing； or of certain determinations in it。
Logically； it is merely the copula of a judgement。 The proposition；
God is omnipotent； contains two conceptions； which have a certain
object or content； the word is； is no additional predicate… it
merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject。 Now； if
I take the subject （God） with all its predicates （omnipotence being
one）； and say： God is； or； There is a God； I add no new predicate to
the conception of God； I merely posit or affirm the existence of the
subject with all its predicates… I posit the object in relation to
my conception。 The content of both is the same； and there is no
addition made to the conception； which expresses merely the
possibility of the object； by my cogitating the object… in the
expression； it is… as absolutely given or existing。 Thus the real
contains no more than the possible。 A hundred real dollars contain
no more than a hundred possible dollars。 For； as the latter indicate
the conception； and the former the object； on the supposition that the
content of the former was greater than that of the latter； my
conception would not be an expression of the whole object； and would
consequently be an inadequate conception of it。 But in reckoning my
wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than
in a hundred possible dollars… that is； in the mere conception of
them。 For the real object… the dollars… is not analytically
contained in my conception； but forms a synthetical addition to my
conception （which is merely a determination of my mental state）；
although this objective reality… this existence… apart from my
conceptions； does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid
hundred dollars。
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates… even to the
complete determination of it… I may cogitate a thing； I do not in
the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the
statement： This thing exists。 Otherwise； not exactly the same； but
something more than what was cogitated in my conception； would
exist； and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception
had real existence。 If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of
reality except one； the mode of reality which is absent is not added
to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing
exists； on the contrary； the thing exists… if it exist at all… with
the same defect as that cogitated in its conception； otherwise not
that which was cogitated； but something different； exists。 Now； if I
cogitate a being as the highest reality； without defect or
imperfection； the question still remains… whether this being exists or
not？ For； although no element is wanting in the possible real
content of my conception； there is a defect in its relation to my
mental state； that is； I am ignorant whether the cognition of the
object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori。 And
here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent。 If the
question regarded an object of sense merely； it would be impossible
for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing。 For
the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according
with the general conditions of experience； while the existence of
the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of
actual experience。 At the same time； this connection with the world of
experience does not in the least augment the conception； although a
possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind。
But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone； it is not
to be wondered at； that we should find ourselves unable to present any
criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility。
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object； it is
necessary to go beyond it； if we wish to predicate existence of the
object。 In the case of sensuous objects； this is attained by their
connection according to empirical laws with some one of my
perceptions； but there is no means of cognizing the existence of
objects of pure thought； because it must be cognized completely a
priori。 But all our knowledge of existence （be it immediately by
perception； or by inferences connecting some object with a perception）
belongs entirely to the sphere of experience… which is in perfect
unity with itself； and although an existence out of this sphere cannot
be absolutely declared to be impossible； it is a hypothesis the
truth of which we have no means of ascertaining。
The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful
idea； but for the very reason that it is an idea； it is incapable of
enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things。 It
is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being
which we do not know to exist。 The analytical criterion of
possibility； which consists in the absence of contradiction in
propositions； cannot be denied it。 But the connection of real
properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an
a priori judgement cannot be formed； because these realities are not
presented to us specifically； and even if this were to happen； a
judgement would still be impossible； because the criterion of the
possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the
world of experience； to which the object of an idea cannot belong。 And
thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to
establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime
ideal being。
Th