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originate for the first time； but would likewise have always
existed。 The causality； therefore； of a cause； whereby something
happens； is itself a thing that has happened。 Now this again
presupposes； in conformity with the law of nature； a previous
condition and its causality； and this another anterior to the
former； and so on。 If； then； everything happens solely in accordance
with the laws of nature； there cannot be any real first beginning of
things； but only a subaltern or comparative beginning。 There cannot；
therefore； be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which
originate the one from the other。 But the law of nature is that
nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause。 The
proposition therefore… if all causality is possible only in accordance
with the laws of nature… is； when stated in this unlimited and general
manner； self…contradictory。 It follows that this cannot be the only
kind of causality。
From what has been said； it follows that a causality must be
admitted； by means of which something happens； without its cause being
determined according to necessary laws by some other cause
preceding。 That is to say； there must exist an absolute spontaneity of
cause； which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds
according to natural laws… consequently transcendental freedom；
without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena
on the side of causes is never complete。
ANTITHESIS。
There is no such thing as freedom； but everything in the world
happens solely according to the laws of nature。
PROOF。
Granted； that there does exist freedom in the transcendental
sense； as a peculiar kind of causality； operating to produce events in
the world… a faculty； that is to say； of originating a state； and
consequently a series of consequences from that state。 In this case；
not only the series originated by this spontaneity； but the
determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the
series； that is to say； the causality itself must have an absolute
commencement； such that nothing can precede to determine this action
according to unvarying laws。 But every beginning of action presupposes
in the acting cause a state of inaction； and a dynamically primal
beginning of action presupposes a state； which has no connection… as
regards causality… with the preceding state of the cause… which does
not； that is； in any wise result from it。 Transcendental freedom is
therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect； and such a
conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of
the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be
found in experience… is consequently a mere fiction of thought。
We have； therefore； nothing but nature to which we must look for
connection and order in cosmical events。 Freedom… independence of
the laws of nature… is certainly a deliverance from restraint； but
it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule。 For it
cannot be alleged that； instead of the laws of nature； laws of freedom
may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature。 For；
if freedom were determined according to laws； it would be no longer
freedom； but merely nature。 Nature； therefore； and transcendental
freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness。
The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the
origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes；
inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby； while it
compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in
conformity with law。 The latter； on the contrary； holds out to the
understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes；
by conducting it to an unconditioned causality； which professes to
have the power of spontaneous origination； but which； in its own utter
blindness； deprives it of the guidance of rules； by which alone a
completely connected experience is possible。
OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY。
ON THE THESIS。
The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the
entire content of the psychological conception so termed； which is for
the most part empirical。 It merely presents us with the conception
of spontaneity of action； as the proper ground for imputing freedom to
the cause of a certain class of objects。 It is； however； the true
stumbling…stone to philosophy； which meets with unconquerable
difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned
causality。 That element in the question of the freedom of the will；
which bas for so long a time placed speculative reason in such
perplexity； is properly only transcendental； and concerns the
question； whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous
origination of a series of successive things or states。 How such a
faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry； for in the case of
natural causality itself； we are obliged to content ourselves with the
a priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed； although
we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing
is possible through the being of another； but must for this
information look entirely to experience。 Now we have demonstrated this
necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena； only
in so far as it is required for the comprehension of an origin of
the world； all following states being regarded as a succession
according to laws of nature alone。 But； as there has thus been
proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself originate a
series in time… although we are unable to explain how it can exist… we
feel ourselves authorized to admit； even in the midst of the natural
course of events； a beginning； as regards causality； of different
successions of phenomena； and at the same time to attribute to all
substances a faculty of free action。 But we ought in this case not
to allow ourselves to fall into a common misunderstanding； and to
suppose that； because a successive series in the world can only have a
comparatively first beginning… another state or condition of things
always preceding… an absolutely first beginning of a series in the
course of nature is impossible。 For we are not speaking here of an
absolutely first beginning in relation to time； but as regards
causality alone。 When； for example； I； completely of my own free will；
and independently of the necessarily determinative influence of
natural causes； rise from my chair； there commences with this event；
including its material consequences in infinitum； an absolutely new
series； although； in relation to time； this event is merely the
continuation of a preceding series。 For this resolution and act of
mine do not form part of the succession of effects in nature； and
are not mere continuations of it； on t