vill2-第6章

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omplex；　and　to　have　been　put　together　out　of　elements　which　do　not　work　well　together。　　　　　We　meet　discrepancies　and　confusion　at　the　very　threshold　in　the　treatment　of　the　modes　in　which　the　villain　status　has　its　origin。　The　most　common　way　of　becoming　a　villain　was　to　be　born　to　this　estate；　and　it　seems　that　we　ought　to　find　very　definite　rules　as　to　this　case。　In　truth；　the　doctrine　was　changing。　Glanville　（v。　6）　tried　in　a　way　to　conform　to　the　Roman　rule　of　the　child　following　the　condition　of　the　mother；　but　it　could　not　be　made　to　work　in　England；　and　ever　since　Bracton；　both　common　law　and　jurisprudence　reject　it。　At　the　close　of　the　Middle　Ages　it　was　held　that　if　born　in　wedlock　the　child　took　after　his　father；*　and　that　a　bastard　was　to　be　accepted　as　filius　nullius　and　presumed　free。*　Bracton　is　more　intricate；　the　bastard　follows　the　mother；　the　legitimate　child　follows　the　father；　and　there　is　one　exception；　in　this　way；　that　the　legitimate　child　of　a　free　man　and　a　nief　born　in　villainage　takes　after　the　mother。*　It　is　not　difficult　to　see　why　the　Roman　rule　did　not　fit；　it　was　too　plain　for　a　state　of　things　which　had　to　be　considered　from　three　different　sides。*　The　Roman　lawyer　merely　looked　to　the　question　of　status　and　decided　it　on　the　ground　of　material　demonstrability　of　origin；*　if　such　an　expression　may　be　used。　The　Medieval　lawyer　had　the　Christian　sanctification　of　marriage　to　reckon　with；　and　so　the　one　old　rule　had　to　be　broken　up　into　two　rules…one　applicable　to　legitimate　children；　the　other　to　bastards。　In　case　of　bastardy　the　tendency　was　decidedly　in　favour　of　retaining　the　Roman　rule；　equally　suiting　animals　and　slaves；　and　the　later　theory　embodied　in　Littleton　belongs　already　to　the　development　of　modern　ideas　in　favour　of　liberty。*　In　case　of　legitimacy　the　recognition　of　marriage　led　to　the　recognition　of　the　family　and　indirectly　to　the　closer　connexion　with　the　father　as　the　head　of　the　family。　In　addition　to　this　a　third　element　comes　in；　which　may　be　called　properly　feudal。　The　action　of　the　father…rule　is　modified　by　the　influence　of　territorial　subjection。　The　marriage　of　a　free　man　with　a　nief　may　be　considered　from　a　special　point　of　view；　if；　as　the　feudal　phraseology　goes；　he　enters　to　her　into　her　villainage。*　By　this　fact　the　free　man　puts　his　child　under　the　sway　of　the　lord；　to　whose　villainage　the　mother　belongs。　It　is　not　the　character　of　the　tenement　itself　which　is　important　in　this　case；　but　the　fact　of　subjection　to　a　territorial　lord；　whose　interest　it　is　to　retain　a　dependant's　progeny　in　a　state　of　dependency。　The　whole　system　is　historically　important；　because　it　illustrates　the　working　of　one　of　the　chief　ingredients　of　villainage；　an　ingredient　entirely　absent　from　ancient　slavery；　whereas　medieval　villainage　depends　primarily　on　subjection　to　the　territorial　power　of　the　lord。　Once　more　we　are　shown　the　practical　importance　of　the　manorial　system　in　fashioning　the　state　of　the　peasantry。　Generally　a　villain　must　be　claimed　with　reference　to　a　manor；　in　connexion　with　an　unfree　hearth；　he　is　born　in　a　nest；*　which　makes　him　a　bondman。　The　strict　legal　notion　has　to　be　modified　to　meet　the　emergency；　and　villainage；　instead　of　indicating　complete　personal　subjection；　comes　to　mean　subjection　to　a　territorial　lord。　　　　　This　same　territorial　element　not　only　influences　the　status　of　the　issue　of　a　marriage；　it　also　affects　the　status　of　the　parties　to　a　marriage；　when　those　parties　are　of　unequal　condition。　Most　notable　is　the　case　of　the　free　wife　of　a　villain　husband　lapsing　into　servitude；　when　she　enters　the　villain　tenement　of　her　consort；　her　servitude　endures　as　long　as　her　husband　is　in　the　lord's　power；　as　long　as　he　is　alive　and　not　enfranchised。　The　judicial　practice　of　the　thirteenth　century　gives　a　great　number　of　cases　where　the　tribunals　refuse　to　vindicate　the　rights　of　women　entangled　in　villainage　by　a　mesalliance。*　Such　subjection　is　not　absolute；　however。　The　courts　make　a　distinction　between　acquiring　possession　and　retaining　it。　The　same　woman　who　will　be　refused　a　portion　of　her　father's　inheritance　because　she　has　married　a　serf；　has　the　assize　of　novel　disseisin　against　any　person　trying　to　oust　her　from　a　tenement　of　which　she　had　been　seised　before　her　marriage。*　The　conditional　disabilities　of　the　free　woman　are　not　directly　determined　by　the　holding　which　she　has　entered；　but　by　her　marital　subordination　to　an　unfree　husband　（'sub　virga；'　Bract。　Note…book；　pl。　1685）；　For　this　reason　the　position　of　a　free　husband　towards　the　villainage　of　his　wife　a　nief　is　not　exactly　parallel。　He　is　only　subject　to　the　general　rules　as　to　free　men　holding　in　villainage。*　In　any　case；　however；　the　instances　which　we　have　been　discussing　afford　good　illustrations　of　the　fact；　that　villainage　by　no　means　flows　from　the　simple　source　of　personal　subjection；　it　is　largely　influenced　by　the　Christian　organisation　of　the　family　and　by　the　feudal　mixture　of　rights　of　property　and　sovereignty　embodied　in　the　manorial　system。　　　　　There　are　two　other　ways　of　becoming　a　villain　besides　being　born　to　the　condition；　the　acknowledgment　of　unfree　status　in　a　court　of　record；　and　prescription。　We　need　not　speak　of　the　first；　as　it　does　not　present　any　particulars　of　interest　from　a　historical　point　of　view。　As　to　prescription；　there　is　a　very　characteristic　vacillation　in　our　sources。　In　pleadings　of　Edward　III's　time　its　possibility　is　admitted；　and　it　is　pointed　out；　that　it　is　a　good　plea　if　the　person　claimed　by　prescription　shows　that　his　father　and　grandfather*　were　strangers。　　　　　There　is　a　curious　explanatory　gloss；　in　a　Cambridge　MS。　of　Bracton；　which　seems　to　go　back　at　least　to　the　beginning　of　the　fourteenth　century；　and　it　maintains　that　free　stock　doing　villain　service　lapses　into　villainage　in　the　fifth　generation　only。*　On　the　other　hand；　Britton　flatly　denies　the　possibility　of　such　a　thing；　according　to　him　no　length　of　time　can　render　free　men　villains　or　make　villains　free　men。　Moreover　he　gives　a　supposed　case　（possibly　based　on　an　actual　trial）；　in　which　a　person　claimed　as　a　villain　is　made　to　go　back　to　the　sixth　generation　to　establish　his　freedom；*　It　does　not　seem　likely　that　people　could　often　vindicate　their　freedom　by　such　elaborate　argument；　but　the　legal　assumption　expounded　in　Britton　deserves　full　attention。　It　is　only　a　consequence　of　the　general　view；　that　neither　the　holding　nor　the　services　ought　to　have　any　influence　on　the　status　of　a　man；　and　in　so　far　it　seems　legally　correct。　But　it　is　easy　to　see　how　difficult　it　must　have　been　to　keep　up　these　nice　distinctions　in　practice；　how　difficult　for　those　who　for　generations　had　been　placed　in　the　same　material　position　with　serfs　to　maintain　personal　freedom。*　For　both　views；　though　absolutely　opposed　to　each　other；　are　in　a　sense　equally　true：　the　one　giving　the　logical　development　of　a　fundamental　rule　of　the　law；　the　other　testifying　to　the　facts。　And　so　we　have　one　more　general　observation　to　make　as　to　the　legal　aspect　of　villainage。　Even　in　the　definition　of　its　fundamental　principles　we　see　notable　discrepancies　and　vacillations；　which　are　the　result　of　the　conflict　between　lo