vill2-第3章

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villainage　（qil　est　nostre　vileyn；　and　nothing　else）。　The　plaintiff　replies　that　he　was　enfranchised　by　being　suffered　to　plead　in　an　assize　of　mort　d'ancestor　against　B。P。's　grandmother。　By　this　the　defendant's　counsel　is　driven　to　maintain　that　his　client's　right　against　T。A。　descended　not　from　his　grandmother　but　from　his　grandfather；　who　was　seised　of　the　manor　of　H。　to　which　T。A。　belonged　as　a　villain。*　The　connexion　with　the　manor　is　adduced　to　show　from　what　quarter　the　right　to　the　villain　had　descended；　and；　of　course；　implies　nothing　as　to　any　peculiarity　of　this　villain's　status；　or　as　to　the　kind　of　title；　the　mode　of　acquiring　rights；　upon　which　the　lord　relies　　it　was　ground　common　to　both　parties　that　if　the　lord　had　any　rights　at　all　he　acquired　them　by　inheritance。　　　　　Another　case　seems　even　more　interesting。　It　dates　from　1355；　that　is　from　a　time　when　the　usual　terminology　had　already　become　fixed。　It　arose　under　that　celebrated　Statute　of　Labourers　which　played　such　a　prominent　part　in　the　social　history　of　the　fourteenth　century。　One　of　the　difficulties　in　working　the　statute　came　from　the　fact　that　it　had　to　recognise　two　different　sets　of　relations　between　the　employer　and　the　workman。　The　statute　dealt　with　the　contract　between　master　and　servant；　but　it　did　not　do　away　with　the　dependence　of　the　villain　on　the　lord；　and　in　case　of　conflict　it　gave　precedence　to　this　latter　claim；　a　lord　had　the　right　to　withdraw　his　villain　from　a　stranger's　service。　Such　cross　influences　could　not　but　occasion　a　great　deal　of　confusion；　and　our　case　gives　a　good　instance　of　it。　Thomas　Barentyn　has　reclaimed　Ralph　Crips　from　the　service　of　the　Prior　of　the　Hospitalers；　and　the　employer　sues　in　consequence　both　his　former　servant　and　Barentyn。　This　last　answers；　that　the　servant　in　question　is　his　villain　regardant　to　the　manor　of　C。　The　plaintiffs　counsel　maintains　that　he　could　not　have　been　regardant　to　the　manor；　as　he　was　going　about　at　large　at　his　free　will　and　as　a　free　man；　for　this　reason　A。　the　former　owner　of　the　manor　was　never　seised　of　him；　and　not　being　seised　could　not　transfer　the　seisin　to　the　present　owner；　although　he　transferred　the　manor。　For　the　defendant　it　is　pleaded；　that　going　about　freely　is　no　enfranchisement；　that　by　the　gift　of　the　manor　every　right　connected　with　the　manor　was　also　conferred　and　that　consequently　the　new　lord　could　at　any　moment　lay　hands　on　his　man；　as　the　former　lord　could　have　done　in　his　time。　Ultimately　the　plaintiff　offers　to　join　issue　on　the　question；　whether　the　servant　had　been　a　villain　regardant　to　the　manor　of　C。　or　not。　The　defendant　asserts；　rather　late　in　the　day；　that　even　if　the　person　in　question　was　not　a　villain　regardant　to　the　manor　of　C。　the　mere　fact　of　his　being　a　villain　in　gross　would　entitle　his　lord　to　call　him　away。　This　attempt　to　start　on　a　new　line　is　not　allowed　by　the　Court　because　the　claim　had　originally　been　traversed　on　the　ground　of　the　connexion　with　the　manor。　　　　　The　peculiarity　of　the　case　is　that　a　third　person　has　an　interest　to　prove　that　the　man　claimed　as　villain　had　been　as　a　free　man。　Usually　there　were　but　two　parties　in　the　contest　about　status；　the　lord　pulling　one　way　and　the　person　claimed　pulling　the　other　way；　but；　through　the　influence　of　the　Statute　of　Labourers；　in　our　case　lord　and　labourer　were　at　one　against　a　third　party；　the　labourer's　employer。　The　acknowledgment　of　villainage　by　the　servant　did　not　settle　the　question；　because；　though　binding　for　the　future；　it　was　not　sufficient　to　show　that　villainage　had　existed　in　the　past；　that　is　at　the　time　when　the　contract　of　hire　and　service　was　broken　through　the　interference　of　the　lord。　Everything　depended　on　the　settlement　of　one　question　was　the　lord　seised　at　the　time；　or　not？　Both　parties　agree　that　the　lord　was　not　actually　seised　of　the　person；　both　agree　that　he　was　seised　of　the　manor；　and　both　suppose　that　if　the　person　had　as　a　matter　of　fact　been　attached　to　the　manor　it　would　have　amounted　to　a　seisin　of　the　person。　And　so　the　contention　is　shifted　to　this　point：　can　a　man　be　claimed　through　the　medium　of　a　manor；　if　he　has　not　been　actually　living；　working　and　serving　in　it？　The　court　assumes　the　possibility；　and　so　the　parties　appeal　to　the　country　to　decide　whether　in　point　of　fact　Ralph　Crips　the　shepherd　had　been　in　legal　if　not　in　actual　connexion　with　the　manor；　i。e。　could　be　traced　to　it　personally　or　through　his　relatives。　　　　　The　case　is　interesting　in　many　ways。　It　shows　that　the　same　man　could　be　according　to　the　point　of　view　considered　both　as　a　villain　in　regard　to　a　manor；　and　as　a　villain　in　gross。　The　relative　character　of　the　classification　is　thus　illustrated　as　well　as　its　importance　for　practical　purposes。　The　transmission　of　a　manor　is　taken　to　include　the　persons　engaged　in　the　cultivation　of　its　soil；　and　even　those　whose　ancestors　have　been　engaged　in　such　cultivation；　and　who　have　no　special　plea　for　severing　the　connexion。　　　　　As　to　the　outcome　of　the　whole　inquiry；　we　may；　it　seems　to　me；　safely　establish　the　following　points：　1。　The　terms　'regardant'　and　'in　gross'　have　nothing　to　do　with　a　legal　distinction　of　status。　2。　They　come　up　in　connexion　with　the　modes　of　proof　and　pleading　during　the　fourteenth　century。　3。　They　may　apply　to　the　same　person　from　different　points　of　view。　4。　'Villain　in　gross'　means　a　villain　without　further　qualification；　'villain　regardant　to　a　manor'　means　villain　by　reference　to　a　manor。　5。　The　connexion　with　a　manor；　though　only　a　matter　of　fact　and　not　binding　the　lord　in　any　way；　might　yet　be　legally　serviceable　to　him；　as　a　means　of　establishing　and　proving　his　rights　over　the　person　he　claimed。　　　　　I　need　hardly　mention；　after　what　has　been　said；　that　there　is　no　such　thing　as　this　distinction　in　the　thirteenth　century　law　books。　I　must　not　omit；　however；　to　refer　to　one　expression　which　may　be　taken　to　stand　in　the　place　of　the　later　'villain　regardant　to　a　manor。'　Britton　（ii；　55）　gives　the　formula　of　the　special　plea　of　villain　ge　to　the　assize　of　mort　d'ancestor　in　the　following　words。　'Ou　il　poie　dire　qe　il　est　soen　vileyn　et　soen　astrier　et　demourrant　en　son　villenage。'　There　can　be　no　doubt　that　residence　on　the　lord's　land　is　meant；　and　the　term　astrier　leads　even　further；　it　implies　residence　at　a　particular　hearth　or　in　a　particular　house。　Fleta　gives　the　assize　of　novel　disseisin　to　those　who　have　been　a　long　time　away　from　their　villain　hearth*　（'extra　astrum　suum　villanum；'　p；　217）。　If　the　term　'astrier'　were　restricted　to　villains　it　would　have　proved　a　great　deal　more　than　the　'villain　regardant'　usually　relied　upon。　But　it　is　of　very　wide　application。　Britton　uses　it　of　free　men　entitled　to　rights　of　common　by　reason　of　tenements　they　hold　in　a　township　（i；　392）。　Bracton　speaks　of　the　case　of　a　nephew　coming　into　an　inheritance　in　preference　to　the　uncle　because　he　had　been　living　at　the　same　hearth　or　in　the　same　hall　（in　atrio　or　astro）　with　the　former　owner；*　and　in　such　or　a　similar　sense　the　word　appears　to　have　been　usually　employed　by　lawyers。*　On　the　other　hand；　if　we　look　in　Bracton's　treatise　for　parallel　passages　to　those　quoted　from　the　Fleta　and　Britton　ab