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can never secure himself against a hostile people； because of their being
too many； whilst from the nobles he can secure himself； as they are few in
number。 The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be
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abandoned by them； but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear
abandonment； but also that they will rise against him； for they； being in
these affairs more far… seeing and astute； always come forward in time to
save themselves； and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to
prevail。 Further； the prince is compelled to live always with the same
people； but he can do well without the same nobles； being able to make
and unmake them daily； and to give or take away authority when it pleases
him。
Therefore； to make this point clearer； I say that the nobles ought to be
looked at mainly in two ways： that is to say； they either shape their course
in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune； or they do not。 Those
who so bind themselves； and are not rapacious； ought to be honoured and
loved； those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways；
they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of
courage； in which case you ought to make use of them； especially of those
who are of good counsel； and thus； whilst in prosperity you honour them；
in adversity you do not have to fear them。 But when for their own
ambitious ends they shun binding themselves； it is a token that they are
giving more thought to themselves than to you； and a prince ought to
guard against such； and to fear them as if they were open enemies； because
in adversity they always help to ruin him。
Therefore； one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly； and this he can easily do seeing they only ask
not to be oppressed by him。 But one who； in opposition to the people；
becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles； ought； above everything； to
seek to win the people over to himself； and this he may easily do if he
takes them under his protection。 Because men； when they receive good
from him of whom they were expecting evil； are bound more closely to
their benefactor； thus the people quickly become more devoted to him
than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours； and the
prince can win their affections in many ways； but as these vary according
to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules； so I omit them； but； I
repeat； it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly； otherwise he
has no security in adversity。
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Nabis；＇*＇ Prince of the Spartans； sustained the attack of all Greece；
and of a victorious Roman army； and against them he defended his country
and his government； and for the overcoming of this peril it was only
necessary for him to make himself secure against a few； but this would not
have been sufficient had the people been hostile。 And do not let any one
impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 〃He who builds on the
people； builds on the mud；〃 for this is true when a private citizen makes a
foundation there； and persuades himself that the people will free him when
he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates； wherein he would
find himself very often deceived； as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and
to Messer Giorgio Scali＇＋＇ in Florence。 But granted a prince who has
established himself as above； who can command； and is a man of courage；
undismayed in adversity； who does not fail in other qualifications； and
who； by his resolution and energy； keeps the whole people encouraged
such a one will never find himself deceived in them； and it will be shown
that he has laid his foundations well。
＇*＇ Nabis； tyrant of Sparta； conquered by the Romans under
Flamininus in 195 B。C。； killed 192 B。C。
＇＋＇ Messer Giorgio Scali。 This event is to be found in Machiavelli's
〃Florentine History；〃 Book III。
These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government； for such princes either rule
personally or through magistrates。 In the latter case their government is
weaker and more insecure； because it rests entirely on the goodwill of
those citizens who are raised to the magistracy； and who； especially in
troubled times； can destroy the government with great ease； either by
intrigue or open defiance； and the prince has not the chance amid tumults
to exercise absolute authority； because the citizens and subjects；
accustomed to receive orders from magistrates； are not of a mind to obey
him amid these confusions； and there will always be in doubtful times a
scarcity of men whom he can trust。 For such a prince cannot rely upon
what he observes in quiet times； when citizens have need of the state；
because then every one agrees with him； they all promise； and when death
is far distant they all wish to die for him； but in troubled times； when the
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state has need of its citizens； then he finds but few。 And so much the more
is this experiment dangerous； inasmuch as it can only be tried once。
Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will
always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and
of him； and then he will always find them faithful。
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CHAPTER X
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF
ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED
It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities： that is； whether a prince has such power that； in case
of need； he can support himself with his own resources； or whether he has
always need of the assistance of others。 And to make this quite clear I say
that I consider those