the commonwealth of oceana-第17章

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beneficiaries；　or　military　colonies；　it　must　be　either　for　life；　and　this　an　army　of　Oceaners　in　their　own　country；　especially　having　estates　of　inheritance；　will　never　bear　because　such　an　army　so　planted　is　as　well　confiscated　as　the　people；　nor　had　the　Mamelukes　been　contented　with　such　usage　in　Egypt；　but　that　they　were　foreigners；　and　daring　not　to　mix　with　the　natives；　it　was　of　absolute　necessity　to　their　being。　　　　　Or　planting　them　upon　inheritance；　whether　aristocratically　as　the　Neustrians；　or　democratically　as　the　Israelites；　they　grow　up　by　certain　consequences　into　the　national　interest；　and　this；　if　they　be　planted　popularly；　comes　to　a　commonwealth；　if　by　way　of　nobility；　to　a　mixed　monarchy；　which　of　all　other　will　be　found　to　be　the　only　kind　of　monarchy　whereof　this　nation；　or　any　other　that　is　of　no　greater　extent；　has　been　or　can　be　capable；　for　if　the　Israelites；　though　their　democratical　balance；　being　fixed　by　their　agrarian；　stood　firm；　be　yet　found　to　have　elected　kings；　it　was　because；　their　territory　lying　open；　they　were　perpetually　invaded；　and　being　perpetually　invaded；　turned　themselves　to　anything　which；　through　the　want　of　experience；　they　thought　might　be　a　remedy；　whence　their　mistake　in　election　of　their　kings；　under　whom　they　gained　nothing；　but；　on　the　contrary；　lost　all　they　had　acquired　by　their　commonwealth；　both　estates　and　liberties；　is　not　only　apparent；　but　without　parallel。　And　if　there　have　been；　as　was　shown；　a　kingdom　of　the　Goths　in　Spain；　and　of　the　Vandals　in　Asia；　consisting　of　a　single　person　and　a　Parliament　（taking　a　parliament　to　be　a　council　of　the　people　only；　without　a　nobility）；　it　is　expressly　said　of　those　councils　that　they　deposed　their　kings　as　often　as　they　pleased；　nor　can　there　be　any　other　consequence　of　such　a　government；　seeing　where　there　is　a　council　of　the　people　they　do　never　receive　laws；　but　give　them；　and　a　council　giving　laws　to　a　single　person；　he　has　no　means　in　the　world　whereby　to　be　any　more　than　a　subordinate　magistrate　but　force：　in　which　case　he　is　not　a　single　person　and　a　parliament；　but　a　single　person　and　an　army；　which　army　again　must　be　planted　as　has　been　shown；　or　can　be　of　no　long　continuance。　　　　　It　is　true；　that　the　provincial　balance　bring　in　nature　quite　contrary　to　the　national；　you　are　no　way　to　plant　a　provincial　army　upon　dominion。　But　then　you　must　have　a　native　territory　in　strength；　situation；　or　government；　able　to　overbalance　the　foreign；　or　you　can　never　hold　it。　That　an　army　should　in　any　other　case　be　long　supported　by　a　mere　tax；　is　a　mere　fancy　as　void　of　all　reason　and　experience　as　if　a　man　should　think　to　maintain　such　a　one　by　robbing　of　orchards；　for　a　mere　tax　is　but　pulling　of　plum…trees；　the　roots　whereof　are　in　other　men's　grounds；　who；　suffering　perpetual　violence；　come　to　hate　the　author　of　it；　and　it　is　a　maxim；　that　no　prince　that　is　hated　by　his　people　can　be　safe。　Arms　planted　upon　dominion　extirpate　enemies　and　make　friends；　but　maintained　by　a　mere　tax；　have　enemies　that　have　roots；　and　friends　that　have　none。　　　　　To　conclude；　Oceana；　or　any　other　nation　of　no　greater　extent；　must　have　a　competent　nobility；　or　is　altogether　incapable　of　monarchy；　for　where　there　is　equality　of　estates；　there　must　be　equality　of　power；　and　where　there　is　equality　of　power；　there　can　be　no　monarchy。　　　　　To　come　then　to　the　generation　of　the　commonwealth。　It　has　been　shown　how；　through　the　ways　and　means　used　by　Panurgus　to　abase　the　nobility；　and　so　to　mend　that　flaw　which　we　have　asserted　to　be　incurable　in　this　kind　of　constitution；　he　suffered　the　balance　to　fall　into　the　power　of　the　people；　and　so　broke　the　government；　but　the　balance　being　in　the　people；　the　commonwealth　（though　they　do　not　see　it）　is　already　in　the　nature　of　them。　There　wants　nothing　else　but　time；　which　is　slow　and　dangerous；　or　art；　which　would　be　more　quick　and　secure；　for　the　bringing　those　native　arms；　wherewithal　they　are　found　already；　to　resist；　they　know　not　how；　everything　that　opposes　them；　to　such　maturity　as　may　fix　them　upon　their　own　strength　and　bottom。　　　　　But　whereas　this　art　is　prudence；　and　that　part　of　prudence　which　regards　the　present　work　is　nothing　else　but　the　skill　of　raising　such　superstructures　of　government　as　are　natural　to　the　known　foundations；　they　never　mind　the　foundation；　but　through　certain　animosities；　wherewith　by　striving　one　against　another　they　are　infected；　or　through　freaks；　by　which；　not　regarding　the　course　of　things；　nor　how　they　conduce　to　their　purpose；　they　are　given　to　building　in　the　air；　come　to　be　divided　and　subdivided　into　endless　parties　and　factions；　both　civil　and　ecclesiastical；　which；　briefly　to　open；　I　shall　first　speak　of　the　people　in　general；　and　then　of　their　divisions。　　　　　A　people；　says　Machiavel；　that　is　corrupt；　is　not　capable　of　a　commonwealth。　But　in　showing　what　a　corrupt　people　is；　he　has　either　involved　himself；　or　me；　nor　can　I　otherwise　come　out　of　the　labyrinth；　than　by　saying；　the　balance　altering　a　people；　as　to　the　foregoing　government；　must　of　necessity　be　corrupt；　but　corruption　in　this　sense　signifies　no　more　than　that　the　corruption　of　one　government；　as　in　natural　bodies；　is　the　generation　of　another。　Wherefore　if　the　balance　alters　from　monarchy；　the　corruption　of　the　people　in　this　case　is　that　which　makes　them　capable　of　a　commonwealth。　But　whereas　I　am　not　ignorant　that　the　corruption　which　he　means　is　in　manners；　this　also　is　from　the　balance。　For　the　balance　leading　from　monarchical　into　popular　abates　the　luxury　of　the　nobility；　and；　enriching　the　people；　brings　the　government　from　a　more　private　to　a　more　public　interest　which　coming　nearer；　as　has　been　shown；　to　justice　and　right　reason；　the　people　upon　a　like　alteration　is　so　far　from　such　a　corruption　of　manners　as　should　render　them　incapable　of　a　commonwealth；　that　of　necessity　they　must　thereby　contract　such　a　reformation　of　manners　as　will　bear　no　other　kind　of　government。　On　the　other　side；　where　the　balance　changes　from　popular　to　oligarchical　or　monarchical；　the　public　interest；　with　the　reason　and　justice　included　in　the　sane；　becomes　more　private；　luxury　is　introduced　in　the　room　of　temperance；　and　servitude　in　that　of　freedom；　which　causes　such　a　corruption　of　manners　both　in　the　nobility　and　people；　as；　by　the　example　of　Rome　in　the　time　of　the　Triumvirs；　is　more　at　large　discovered　by　the　author　to　have　been　altogether　incapable　of　a　commonwealth。　　　　　But　the　balance　of　Oceana　changing　quite　contrary　to　that　of　Rome；　the　manners　of　the　people　were　not　thereby　corrupted；　but；　on　the　contrary；　adapted　to　a　commonwealth。　For　differences　of　opinion　in　a　people　not　rightly　informed　of　their　balance；　or　a　division　into　parties　（while　there　is　not　any　common　ligament　of　power　sufficient　to　reconcile　or　hold　them）　is　no　sufficient　proof　of　corruption。　Nevertheless；　seeing　this　must　needs　be　matter　of　scandal　and　danger；　it　will　not　be　amiss；　in　showing　what　were　the　parties；　to　show　what　were　their　errors。　　　　　The　parties　into　which　this　nation　was　divided；　were　temporal　or　spiritual；　and　the　temporal　parties　were　especially　two；　the　one　royalists；　the　other　republicans；　each　of　which　asserted　th