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and extending the empire； demanded to be admitted to all the
privileges of Roman citizens。 Upon being refused； the social war
broke out。 During the course of that war； Rome granted those
privileges to the greater part of them one by one； and in
proportion as they detached themselves from the general
confederacy。 The Parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing
the colonies； and they refuse to be taxed by a Parliament in
which they are not represented。 If to each colony； which should
detach itself from the general confederacy； Great Britain should
allow such a number of representatives as suited the proportion
of what is contributed to the public revenue of the empire； in
consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes； and in
compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its
fellow…subjects at home； the number of its representatives to be
augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards
augment； a new method of acquiring importance； a new and more
dazzling object of ambition would be presented to the leading men
of each colony。 Instead of piddling for the little prizes which
are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony
faction； they might then hope； from the presumption which men
naturally have in their own ability and good fortune； to draw
some of the great prizes which sometimes come from the wheel of
the great state lottery of British polities。 Unless this or some
other method is fallen upon； and there seems to be none more
obvious than this； of preserving the importance and of gratifying
the ambition of the leading men of America； it is not very
probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us； and we
ought to consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing
them to do so is； every drop of it； blood either of those who
are； or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow citizens。
They are very weak who flatter themselves that； in the state to
which things have come； our colonies will be easily conquered by
force alone。 The persons who now govern the resolutions of what
they call their Continental Congress； feel in themselves at this
moment a degree of importance which； perhaps； the greatest
subjects in Europe scarce feel。 From shopkeepers； tradesmen； and
attornies； they are become statesmen and legislators； and are
employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive
empire； which； they flatter themselves； will become； and which；
indeed； seems very likely to become； one of the greatest and most
formidable that ever was in the world。 Five hundred different
people； perhaps； who in different ways act immediately under the
Continental Congress； and five hundred thousand； perhaps； who act
under those five hundred； all feel in the same manner a
proportionable rise in their own importance。 Almost every
individual of the governing party in America fills； at present in
his own fancy； a station superior； not only to what he had ever
filled before； but to what he had ever expected to fill； and
unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or
to his leaders； if he has the ordinary spirit of a man； he will
die in defence of that station。
It is a remark of the president Henaut； that we now read
with pleasure the account of many little transactions of the
Ligue； which when they happened were not perhaps considered as
very important pieces of news。 But every man then； says he；
fancied himself of some importance； and the innumerable memoirs
which have come down to us from those times； were； the greater
part of them； written by people who took pleasure in recording
and magnifying events in which； they flattered themselves； they
had been considerable actors。 How obstinately the city of Paris
upon that occasion defended itself； what a dreadful famine it
supported rather than submit to the best and afterwards to the
most beloved of all the French kings； is well known。 The greater
part of the citizens； or those who governed the greater part of
them； fought in defence of their own importance； which they
foresaw was to be at an end whenever the ancient government
should be re…established。 Our colonies； unless they can be
induced to consent to a union； are very likely to defend
themselves against the best of all mother countries as
obstinately as the city of Paris did against one of the best of
kings。
The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times。
When the people of one state were admitted to the right of
citizenship in another； they had no other means of exercising
that right but by coming in a body to vote and deliberate with
the people of that other state。 The admission of the greater part
of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens
completely ruined the Roman republic。 It was no longer possible
to distinguish between who was and who was not a Roman citizen。
No tribe could know its own members。 A rabble of any kind could
be introduced into the assemblies of the people； could drive out
the real citizens； and decide upon the affairs of the republic as
if they themselves had been such。 But though America were to send
fifty or sixty new representatives to Parliament； the doorkeeper
of the House of Commons could not find any great difficulty in
distinguishing between who was and who was not a member。 Though
the Roman constitution； therefore； was necessarily ruined by the
union of Rome with the allied states of Italy； there is not the
least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by
the union of Great Britain with her colonies。 That constitution；
on the contrary； would be completed by it； and seems to be
imperfect without it。 The assembly which deliberates and decides
concerning the affairs of every part of the empire； in order to
be properly informed； ought certainly to have representatives
from every part of it That this union； however； could be easily
effectuated； or that difficulties and great difficulties might
not occur in the execution； I do not pretend。 I have yet heard of
none； however； which appear insurmountable。 The principal perhaps
arise； not from the nature of things； but from the prejudices and
opinions of the people both on this and on the other side of the
Atlantic。
We； on this side of the water； are afraid lest the multitude
of American representatives should overturn the balance of the
constitution； and increase too much either the influence of the
crown on the one hand； or the force of the democracy on the
other。 But if the number of American representatives were to be
in proportion to the produce of American taxation； the number of
people to be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the
means of managing them； and the means of managing to the number
of people to be managed。 The monarchical and democratical parts
of the constitution would； after the union； stand exactly in the
same degree of relative force with regard to one another as they
had done before。
The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest
their distance from the seat o