按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Lecture XVIII
PHILOSOPHY
The subject of Saintliness left us face to face with the
question； Is the sense of divine presence a sense of anything
objectively true？ We turned first to mysticism for an answer；
and found that although mysticism is entirely willing to
corroborate religion； it is too private （and also too various） in
its utterances to be able to claim a universal authority。 But
philosophy publishes results which claim to be universally valid
if they are valid at all； so we now turn with our question to
philosophy。 Can philosophy stamp a warrant of veracity upon the
religious man's sense of the divine？
I imagine that many of you at this point begin to indulge in
guesses at the goal to which I am tending。 I have undermined the
authority of mysticism； you say； and the next thing I shall
probably do is to seek to discredit that of philosophy。
Religion； you expect to hear me conclude； is nothing but an
affair of faith； based either on vague sentiment； or on that
vivid sense of the reality of things unseen of which in my second
lecture and in the lecture on Mysticism I gave so many examples。
It is essentially private and individualistic； it always exceeds
our powers of formulation； and although attempts to pour its
contents into a philosophic mould will probably always go on； men
being what they are； yet these attempts are always secondary
processes which in no way add to the authority； or warrant the
veracity； of the sentiments from which they derive their own
stimulus and borrow whatever glow of conviction they may
themselves possess。
In short； you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling at the
expense of reason； to rehabilitate the primitive and
unreflective； and to dissuade you from the hope of any Theology
worthy of the name。
To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly。 I do
believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion； and that
philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products； like
translations of a text into another tongue。 But all such
statements are misleading from their brevity； and it will take
the whole hour for me to explain to you exactly what I mean。
When I call theological formulas secondary products； I mean that
in a world in which no religious feeling had ever existed； I
doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever have been
framed。 I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of
the universe； apart from inner unhappiness and need of
deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other；
would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now
possess。 Men would have begun with animistic explanations of
natural fact； and criticised these away into scientific ones； as
they actually have done。 In the science they would have left a
certain amount of 〃psychical research；〃 even as they now will
probably have to re…admit a certain amount。 But high…flying
speculations like those of either dogmatic or idealistic
theology； these they would have had no motive to venture on；
feeling no need of commerce with such deities。 These
speculations must； it seems to me； be classed as over…beliefs；
buildings…out performed by the intellect into directions of which
feeling originally supplied the hint。
But even if religious philosophy had to have its first hint
supplied by feeling； may it not have dealt in a superior way with
the matter which feeling suggested？ Feeling is private and dumb；
and unable to give an account of itself。 It allows that its
results are mysteries and enigmas； declines to justify them
rationally； and on occasion is willing that they should even
pass for paradoxical and absurd。 Philosophy takes just the
opposite attitude。 Her aspiration is to reclaim from mystery and
paradox whatever territory she touches。 To find an escape from
obscure and wayward personal persuasion to truth objectively
valid for all thinking men has ever been the intellect's most
cherished ideal。 To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy；
and to give public status and universal right of way to its
deliverances； has been reason's task。
I believe that philosophy will always have opportunity to labor
at this task。＇288＇ We are thinking beings； and we cannot exclude
the intellect from participating in any of our functions。 Even
in soliloquizing with ourselves； we construe our feelings
intellectually。 Both our personal ideals and our religious and
mystical experiences must be interpreted congruously with the
kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits。 The
philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own
clothing on us。 Moreover； we must exchange our feelings with one
another； and in doing so we have to speak； and to use general and
abstract verbal formulas。 Conceptions and constructions are thus
a necessary part of our religion； and as moderator amid the clash
of hypotheses； and mediator among the criticisms of one man's
constructions by another； philosophy will always have much to do。
It would be strange if I disputed this； when these very lectures
which I am giving are （as you will see more clearly from now
onwards） a laborious attempt to extract from the privacies of
religious experience some general facts which can be defined in
formulas upon which everybody may agree。
＇288＇ Compare Professor W。 Wallace's Gifford Lectures； in
Lectures and Essays； Oxford； 1898； pp。 17 ff。
Religious experience； in other words； spontaneously and
inevitably engenders myths； superstitions； dogmas； creeds； and
metaphysical theologies； and criticisms of one set of these by
the adherents of another。 Of late； impartial classifications and
comparisons have become possible； alongside of the denunciations
and anathemas by which the commerce between creeds used
exclusively to be carried on。 We have the beginnings of a
〃Science of Religions；〃 so…called； and if these lectures could
ever be accounted a crumb…like contribution to such a science； I
should be made very happy。
But all these intellectual operations； whether they be
constructive or comparative and critical； presuppose immediate
experiences as their subject…matter。 They are interpretative and
inductive operations； operations after the fact； consequent upon
religious feeling； not coordinate with it； not independent of
what it ascertains。
The intellectualism in religion which I wish to discredit
pretends to be something altogether