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。 But you must note that the state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities； for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate； which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principality； because the sons of the old prince are not the heirs； but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority； and the sons remain only noblemen。 And this being an ancient custom； it cannot be called a new principality； because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones； for although the prince is new； the constitution of the state is old； and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord。
But returning to the subject of our discourse； I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above…named emperors； and it will be recognized also how it happened that； a number of them acting in one way and a number in another； only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones。 Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander； being new princes； to imitate Marcus； who was heir to the principality； and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla； Commodus； and Maximinus to have imitated Severus； they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps。 Therefore a prince； new to the principality； cannot imitate the actions of Marcus； nor； again； is it necessary to follow those of Severus； but he ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state； and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm。
CHAPTER XX
ARE FORTRESSES； AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT； ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL？
1。 Some princes； so as to hold securely the state； have disarmed their subjects； others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions； others have fostered enmities against themselves； others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments； some have built fortresses； some have overthrown and destroyed them。 And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made； nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit。
2。 There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects； rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them； because； by arming them； those arms become yours； those men who were distrusted become faithful； and those who were faithful are kept so； and your subjects become your adherents。 And whereas all subjects cannot be armed； yet when those whom you do arm are benefited； the others can be handled more freely； and this difference in their treatment； which they quite understand； makes the former your dependents； and the latter； considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward； excuse you。 But when you disarm them； you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them； either for cowardice or for want of loyalty； and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you。 And because you cannot remain unarmed； it follows that you turn to mercenaries； which are of the character already shown； even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects。 Therefore； as I have said； a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms。 Histories are full of examples。 But when a prince acquires a new state； which he adds as a province to his old one； then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state； except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it； and these again； with time and opportunity； should be rendered soft and effeminate； and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you。
3。 Our forefathers； and those who were reckoned wise； were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses； and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily。 This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced； but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to…day； because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use； rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost； because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist。 The Venetians； moved； as I believe； by the above reasons； fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities； and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed； yet they nursed these disputes amongst them； so that the citizens； distracted by their differences； should not unite against them。 Which； as we saw； did not afterwards turn out as expected； because； after the rout at Vaila； one party at once took courage and seized the state。 Such methods argue； therefore； weakness in the prince； because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality； such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace； but if war comes this policy proves fallacious。
4。 Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted； and therefore fortune； especially when she desires to make a new prince great； who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one； causes enemies to arise and form designs against him； in order that he may have the opportunity of overcoming them； and by them to mount higher； as by a ladder which his enemies have raised。 For this reason many consider that a wise prince； when he has the opportunity； ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself； so that； having crushed it； his renown may rise higher。
5。 Princes； especially new ones； have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted。 Pandolfo Petrucci； Prince of Siena； ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others。 But on this question one cannot speak generally； for it varies so much with the individual； I will only say this； that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile； if they are of a description to need assistance to support themselves； can always be gained over with the greatest ease； and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity； inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them； and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who； serving him in too much security； may neglect his affairs。 And since the matter demands it； I must not fail to warn a prince； who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state； that he must well consider