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as its existence。 The proposition； which affirms it not to
be； however false； is no less conceivable and intelligible；
than that which affirms it to be。 The case is different with
the sciences； properly so called。 Every proposition； which
is not true； is there confused and unintelligible。 That the
cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10； is a false
proposition； and can never be distinctly conceived。 But that
C/AESAR； or the angel G/ABRIEL； or any being never
existed； may be a false proposition； but still is perfectly
conceivable； and implies no contradiction。
The existence； therefore； of any being can only be
proved by arguments from its cause or its effect； and these
arguments are founded entirely on experience。 If we reason
； any thing may appear able to produce any thing。
The falling of a pebble may； for aught we know； extinguish
the sun； or the wish of a man control the planets in their
orbits。 It is only experience； which teaches us the nature
and bounds of cause and effect； and enables us to infer the
existence of one object from that of another。＇40＇ Such is
the foundation of moral reasoning； which forms the greater
part of human knowledge； and is the source of all human
action and behaviour。
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or
general facts。 All deliberations in life regard the former；
as also all disquisitions in history； chronology； geography；
and astronomy。
The sciences； which treat of general facts； are
politics； natural philosophy； physic； chemistry； &c。 where
the qualities； causes and effects of a whole species of
objects are enquired into。
Divinity or Theology； as it proves the existence of a
Deity； and the immortality of souls； is composed partly of
reasonings concerning particular； partly concerning general
facts。 It has a foundation in ； so far as it is
supported by experience。 But its best and most solid
foundation is and divine revelation。
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the
understanding as of taste and sentiment。 Beauty； whether
moral or natural； is felt； more properly than perceived。 Or
if we reason concerning it； and endeavour to fix its
standard； we regard a new fact； to wit； the general tastes
of mankind； or some such fact； which may be the object of
reasoning and enquiry。
When we run over libraries； persuaded of these
principles； what havoc must we make？ If we take in our hand
any volume； of divinity or school metaphysics； for instance；
let us ask； No。 No。 Commit it then to the flames： For it can
contain nothing but sophistry and illusion。
* * * *
NOTES
＇1＇＇COPYRIGHT： （c） 1995； James Fieser （jfieser@utm。edu）； all
rights reserved。 Unaltered copies of this computer text file
may be freely distribute for personal and classroom use。
Alterations to this file are permitted only for purposes of
computer printouts； although altered computer text files may
not circulate。 Except to cover nominal distribution costs；
this file cannot be sold without written permission from the
copyright holder。 This copyright notice supersedes all
previous notices on earlier versions of this text file。 When
quoting from this text； please use the following citation：
； ed。 James Fieser （Internet
Release； 1995）。
EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS： letters between slashes （e。g。；
H/UME） designate small capitalization。 Letters within
angled brackets （e。g。； ） designate italics。 Note
references are contained within square brackets （e。g。； ＇1＇）。
Original pagination is contained within curly brackets
（e。g。； ）。 Spelling and punctuation have not been
modernized。 Printer's errors have been corrected without
note。 Bracketed comments within the end notes are the
editor's。 This is a working draft。 Please report errors to
James Fieser （jfieser@utm。edu）。＇
＇2＇This is not intended any way to detract from the
merit of Mr。 L/OCKE； who was really a great philosopher and
a just and modest reasoner。 It is only meant to show the
common fate of such abstract philosophy。 ＇This note was
removed by Hume from later editions of the 。
J。F。＇
＇3＇That faculty by which we discern truth and
falsehood； and that by which we perceive vice and virtue；
had long been confounded with each other； and all morality
was supposed to be built on external an immutable relations
which； to every intelligent mind； were equally invariable as
any proposition concerning quantity or number。 But a late
philosopher ＇Francis Hutcheson＇ has taught us； by the most
convincing arguments； that morality is nothing in the
abstract nature of things； but is entirely relative to the
sentiment or mental taste of each particular being； in the
same manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter； hot and
cold arise from the particular feeling of each sense or
organ。 Moral perceptions； therefore； ought not to be classed
with the operations of the understanding； but with the
tastes or sentiments。
It had been usual with philosophers to divide all the
passions of the mind into two classes； the selfish and
benevolent； which were supposed to stand in constant
opposition and contrariety； nor was it thought that the
latter could ever attain their proper object but at the
expense of the former。 Among the selfish passions were
ranked avarice； ambition； revenge； among the benevolent；
natural affection； friendship； public spirit。 Philosophers
may now perceive the impropriety of this division。 ＇See
Butler's 。＇ It has been proved； beyond all
controversy； that even the passions commonly esteemed
selfish carry the mind beyond self directly to the object；
that though the satisfaction of these passions gives us
enjoyment； yet the prospect of this enjoyment is not the
cause of the passion； but； on the contrary； the passion is
antecedent to the enjoyment； and without the former the
latter could never possibly exist； that the case is
precisely the same with passions denominated benevolent； and
consequently that a man is no more interested when he seeks
his own glory than when the happiness of his friend is the
object of his wishes； nor is he any more disinterested when
he sacrifices his ease and quiet to public good than when he
labors for the gratification of avarice or ambition。 Here；
therefore； is a considerable adjustment in the boundaries of
the passions； which had been confounded by the negligence or
inaccuracy of former philosophers。 These two instances may
suffice to show us the nature and importance of that species
of philosophy。 ＇This note was removed by Hume from later
editions of the 。 … … J。F。＇
＇4＇I/T is probable that no more was meant by these；
who denied innate ideas； than that all ideas were copies of
our impressions； though it must be confessed； that the
terms； which they employed； were not chosen with such
caution； nor so e