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infinitive divisibility of extension； with its consequences；
as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and
metaphysicians； with a kind of triumph and exultation。 A
real quantity； infinitely less than any finite quantity；
containing quantities infinitely less than itself； and so on
； this is an edifice so bold and prodigious；
that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to
support； because it shocks the clearest and most natural
principles of human reason。＇38＇ But what renders the matter
more extraordinary； is； that these seemingly absurd opinions
are supported by a chain of reasoning； the clearest and most
natural； nor is it possible for us to allow the premises
without admitting the consequences。 Nothing can be more
convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions
concerning the properties of circles and triangles； and yet；
when these are once received； how can we deny； that the
angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is
infinitely less than any rectilineal angle； that as you may
increase the diameter of the circle ； this
angle of contact becomes still less； even ；
and that the angle of contact between other curves and their
tangents may be infinitely less than those between any
circle and its tangent； and so on； ？ The
demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable
as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be
equal to two right ones； though the latter opinion be
natural and easy； and the former big with contradiction and
absurdity。 Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of
amazement and suspence； which； without the suggestions of
any sceptic； gives her a diffidence of herself； and of the
ground on which she treads。 She sees a full light； which
illuminates certain places； but that light borders upon the
most profound darkness。 And between these she is so dazzled
and confounded； that she scarcely can pronounce with
certainty and assurance concerning any one object。
The absurdity of these bold determinations of the
abstract sciences seems to become； if possible； still more
palpable with regard to time than extension。 An infinite
number of real parts of time； passing in succession； and
exhausted one after another； appears so evident a
contradiction； that no man； one should think； whose
judgement is not corrupted； instead of being improved； by
the sciences； would ever be able to admit of it。
Yet still reason must remain restless； and unquiet；
even with regard to that scepticism； to which she is driven
by these seeming absurdities and contradictions。 How any
clear； distinct idea can contain circumstances；
contradictory to itself； or to any other clear； distinct
idea； is absolutely incomprehensible； and is； perhaps； as
absurd as any proposition； which can be formed。 So that
nothing can be more sceptical； or more full of doubt and
hesitation； than this scepticism itself； which arises from
some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the
science of quantity。＇39＇
The sceptical objections to evidence； or to the
reasonings concerning matter of fact； are either
or 。 The popular objections are derived from
the natural weakness of human understanding； the
contradictory opinions； which have been entertained in
different ages and nations； the variations of our judgement
in sickness and health； youth and old age； prosperity and
adversity； the perpetual contradiction of each particular
man's opinions and sentiments； with many other topics of
that kind。 It is needless to insist farther on this head。
These objections are but weak。 For as； in common life； we
reason every moment concerning fact and existence； and
cannot possibly subsist； without continually employing this
species of argument； any popular objections； derived from
thence； must be insufficient to destroy that evidence。 The
great subverter of or the excessive principles
of scepticism is action； and employment； and the occupations
of common life。 These principles may flourish and triumph in
the schools； where it is； indeed； difficult； if not
impossible； to refute them。 But as soon as they leave the
shade； and by the presence of the real objects； which
actuate our passions and sentiments； are put in opposition
to the more powerful principles of our nature； they vanish
like smoke； and leave the most determined sceptic in the
same condition as other mortals。
The sceptic； therefore； had better keep within his
proper sphere； and display those objections；
which arise from more profound researches。 Here he seems to
have ample matter of triumph； while he justly insists； that
all our evidence for any matter of fact； which lies beyond
the testimony of sense or memory； is derived entirely from
the relation of cause and effect； that we have no other idea
of this relation than that of two objects； which have been
frequently together； that we have no argument to
convince us； that objects； which have； in our experience；
been frequently conjoined； will likewise； in other
instances； be conjoined in the same manner； and that nothing
leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct
of our nature； which it is indeed difficult to resist； but
which； like other instincts； may be fallacious and
deceitful。 While the sceptic insists upon these topics； he
shows his force； or rather； indeed； his own and our
weakness； and seems； for the time at least； to destroy all
assurance and conviction。 These arguments might be displayed
at greater length； if any durable good or benefit to society
could ever be expected to result from them。
For here is the chief and most confounding objection to
scepticism； that no durable good can ever result
from it； while it remains in its full force and vigour。 We
need only ask such a sceptic； ？ He is
immediately at a loss； and knows not what to answer。 A
C/OPERNICAN or P/TOLEMAIC； who supports each his different
system of astronomy； may hope to produce a conviction； which
will remain constant and durable； with his audience。 A
S/TOIC or E/PICUREAN displays principles； which may not be
durable； but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour。
But a P/YRRHONIAN cannot expect； that his philosophy will
have any constant influence on the mind： Or if it had； that
its influence would be beneficial to society。 On the
contrary； he must acknowledge； if he will acknowledge any
thing； that all human life must perish； were his principles
universally and steadily to prevail。 All discourse； all
action would immediately cease； and men remain in a total
lethargy； till the necessities of nature； unsatisfied； put
an end to their miserable existence。 It is true； so fatal an
event is very little to be dreaded。 Nature is always too
strong for principle。 And though a P/YRRHONIAN may throw
himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion
by his profound reasonings； the first and most trivial event
in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples