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and necessity； except that of a constant conjunction of
objects； and subsequent inference of the mind from one to
another。 If these circumstances form； in reality； the whole
of that necessity； which we conceive in matter； and if these
circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place
in the operations of the mind； the dispute is at an end； at
least； must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal。 But as
long as we will rashly suppose； that we have some farther
idea of necessity and causation in the operations of
external objects； at the same time； that we can find nothing
farther in the voluntary actions of the mind； there is no
possibility of bringing the question to any determinate
issue； while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition。 The
only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher； to
examine the narrow extent of science when applied to
material causes； and to convince ourselves that all we know
of them is the constant conjunction and inference above
mentioned。 We may； perhaps； find that it is with difficulty
we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human
understanding： But we can afterwards find no difficulty when
we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will。
For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction
with motives and circumstances and characters； and as we
always draw inferences from one to the other； we must be
obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity； which we
have already avowed； in every deliberation of our lives； and
in every step of our conduct and behaviour。＇22＇
But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard
to the question of liberty and necessity； the most
contentious question of metaphysics； the most contentious
science； it will not require many words to prove； that all
mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well
as in that of necessity； and that the whole dispute； in this
respect also； has been hitherto merely verbal。 For what is
meant by liberty； when applied to voluntary actions？ We
cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion
with motives； inclinations； and circumstances； that one does
not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the
other； and that one affords no inference by which we can
conclude the existence of the other。 For these are plain and
acknowledged matters of fact。 By liberty； then； we can only
mean ； this is； if we choose to remain
at rest； we may； if we choose to move； we also may。 Now this
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to
every one who is not a prisoner and in chains。 Here； then；
is no subject of dispute。
Whatever definition we may give of liberty； we should
be careful to observe two requisite circumstances； ；
that it be consistent with plain matter of fact； ；
that it be consistent with itself。 If we observe these
circumstances； and render our definition intelligible； I am
persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with
regard to it。
It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a
cause of its existence； and that chance； when strictly
examined； is a mere negative word； and means not any real
power which has anywhere a being in nature。 But it is
pretended that some causes are necessary； some not
necessary。 Here then is the advantage of definitions。 Let
any one a cause； without comprehending； as a part
of the definition； a with its effect；
and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea；
expressed by the definition； and I shall readily give up the
whole controversy。 But if the foregoing explication of the
matter be received； this must be absolutely impracticable。
Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other； we
should never have entertained any notion of cause and
effect； and this regular conjunction produces that inference
of the understanding； which is the only connexion； that we
can have any comprehension of。 Whoever attempts a definition
of cause； exclusive of these circumstances； will be obliged
either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are
synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define。＇23＇
And if the definition above mentioned be admitted； liberty；
when opposed to necessity； not to constraint； is the same
thing with chance； which is universally allowed to have no
existence。
* * * *
PART II。
T/HERE is no method of reasoning more common； and yet
none more blameable； than； in philosophical disputes； to
endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis； by a pretence of
its dangerous consequences to religion and morality。 When
any opinion leads to absurdities； it is certainly false； but
it is not certain that an opinion is false； because it is of
dangerous consequence。 Such topics； therefore； ought
entirely to be forborne； as serving nothing to the discovery
of truth； but only to make the person of an antagonist
odious。 This I observe in general； without pretending to
draw any advantage from it。 I frankly submit to an
examination of this kind； and shall venture to affirm that
the doctrines； both of necessity and of liberty； as above
explained； are not only consistent with morality； but are
absolutely essential to its support。
Necessity may be defined two ways； conformably to the
two definitions of ； of which it makes an essential
part。 It consists either in the constant conjunction of like
objects； or in the inference of the understanding from one
object to another。 Now necessity； in both these senses；
（which； indeed； are at bottom the same） has universally；
though tacitly； in the schools； in the pulpit； and in common
life； been allowed to belong to the will of man； and no one
has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences
concerning human actions； and that those inferences are
founded on the experienced union of like actions； with like
motives； inclinations； and circumstances。 The only
particular in which any one can differ； is； that either；
perhaps； he will refuse to give the name of necessity to
this property of human actions： But as long as the meaning
is understood； I hope the word can do no harm： Or that he
will maintain it possible to discover something farther in
the operations of matter。 But this； it must be acknowledged；
can be of no consequence to morality or religion； whatever
it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics。 We may here
be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other
necessity or connexion in the actions of body： But surely we
ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind； but what
everyone does； and must readily allow of。 We change no
circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to
the will； but only in that with regard to material objects
and causes。 Nothing； therefore； can be more innocent； at
least； than this doctrine。
All laws being founded on rewards and punishments； it
is supposed as a fundamental principle； that these motives
have