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an enquiry concerning human understanding-第22章

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suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion。 But when
many uniform instances appear; and the same object is always
followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the
notion of cause and connexion。 We then  a new
sentiment or impression; to wit; a customary connexion in
the thought or imagination between one object and its usual
attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea
which we seek for。 For as this idea arises from a number of
similar instances; and not from any single instance; it must
arise from that circumstance; in which the number of
instances differ from every individual instance。 But this
customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the
only circumstance in which they differ。 In every other
particular they are alike。 The first instance which we saw
of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls
(to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar
to any instance that may; at present; occur to us; except
only; that we could not; at first;  one event from
the other; which we are enabled to do at present; after so
long a course of uniform experience。 I know not whether the
reader will readily apprehend this reasoning。 I am afraid
that; should I multiply words about it; or throw it into a
greater variety of lights; it would only become more obscure
and intricate。 In all abstract reasonings there is one point
of view which; if we can happily hit; we shall go farther
towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence
and copious expression in the world。 This point of view we
should endeavour to reach; and reserve the flowers of
rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them。
                              
                          * * * *
                              
                       SECTION VIII。
                 Of Liberty and Necessity。
                              
                          PART I。
                              
     I/T might reasonably be expected in questions which
have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness; since
the first origin of science; and philosophy; that the
meaning of all the terms; at least; should have been agreed
upon among the disputants; and our enquiries; in the course
of two thousand years; been able to pass from words to the
true and real subject of the controversy。 For how easy may
it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in
reasoning; and make these definitions; not the mere sound of
words; the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if
we consider the matter more narrowly; we shall be apt to
draw a quite opposite conclusion。 From this circumstance
alone; that a controversy has been long kept on foot; and
remains still undecided; we may presume that there is some
ambiguity in the expression; and that the disputants affix
different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy。
For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be
naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could
be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it
were impossible; if men affix the same ideas to their terms;
that they could so long form different opinions of the same
subject; especially when they communicate their views; and
each party turn themselves on all sides; in search of
arguments which may give them the victory over their
antagonists。 It is true; if men attempt the discussion of
questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human
capacity; such as those concerning the origin of worlds; or
the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits;
they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests; and
never arrive at any determinate conclusion。 But if the
question regard any subject of common life and experience;
nothing; one would think; could preserve the dispute so long
undecided but some ambiguous expressions; which keep the
antagonists still at a distance; and hinder them from
grappling with each other。

     This has been the case in the long disputed question
concerning liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a
degree that; if I be not much mistaken; we shall find; that
all mankind; both learned and ignorant; have always been of
the same opinion with regard to this subject; and that a few
intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end
to the whole controversy。 I own that this dispute has been
so much canvassed on all hands; and has led philosophers
into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry; that it is no
wonder; if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to
turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question; from
which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment。
But the state of the argument here proposed may; perhaps;
serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty;
promises at least some decision of the controversy; and will
not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure
reasoning。

     I hope; therefore; to make it appear that all men have
ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of
liberty; according to any reasonable sense; which can be put
on these terms; and that the whole controversy; has hitherto
turned merely upon words。 We shall begin with examining the
doctrine of necessity。

     It is universally allowed that matter; in all its
operations; is actuated by a necessary force; and that every
natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of
its cause that no other effect; in such particular
circumstances; could possibly have resulted from it。 The
degree and direction of every motion is; by the laws of
nature; prescribed with such exactness that a living
creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as
motion in any other degree or direction than what is
actually produced by it。 Would we; therefore; form a just
and precise idea of ; we must consider whence
that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of
bodies。

     It seems evident that; if all the scenes of nature were
continually shifted in such a manner that no two events bore
any resemblance to each other; but every object was entirely
new; without any similitude to whatever had been seen
before; we should never; in that case; have attained the
least idea of necessity; or of a connexion among these
objects。 We might say; upon such a supposition; that one
object or event has followed another; not that one was
produced by the other。 The relation of cause and effect must
be utterly unknown to mankind。 Inference and reasoning
concerning the operations of nature would; from that moment;
be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only
canals; by which the knowledge of any real existence could
possibly have access to the mind。 Our idea; therefore; of
necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity
observable in the operations of nature; where similar
objects are constantly conjoined together; and the mind is
determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of
the other。 These two circumstances form the whole of that
necessity; which we ascribe to matter。 Beyond the constant
 of similar objects; and the consequent
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