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learn by experience the frequent C/ONJUNCTION of objects；
without being ever able to comprehend any thing like
C/ONNEXION between them。 Here； then； many philosophers
think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse； on all
occasions； to the same principle； which the vulgar never
appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and
supernatural。 They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be；
not only the ultimate and original cause of all things； but
the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in
nature。 They pretend that those objects which are commonly
denominated ； are in reality nothing but
； and that the true and direct principle of every
effect is not any power or force in nature； but a volition
of the Supreme Being； who wills that such particular objects
should for ever be conjoined with each other。 Instead of
saying that one billiard…ball moves another by a force which
it has derived from the author of nature； it is the Deity
himself； they say； who； by a particular volition； moves the
second ball； being determined to this operation by the
impulse of the first ball； in consequence of those general
laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of
the universe。 But philosophers advancing still in their
inquiries； discover that； as we are totally ignorant of the
power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies； we
are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the
operation of mind on body； or of body on mind； nor are we
able； either from our senses or consciousness； to assign the
ultimate principle in one case more than in the other。 The
same ignorance； therefore； reduces them to the same
conclusion。 They assert that the Deity is the immediate
cause of the union between soul and body； and that they are
not the organs of sense； which； being agitated by external
objects； produce sensations in the mind； but that it is a
particular volition of our omnipotent Maker； which excites
such a sensation； in consequence of such a motion in the
organ。 In like manner； it is not any energy in the will that
produces local motion in our members： It is God himself； who
is pleased to second our will； in itself impotent； and to
command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our
own power and efficacy。 Nor do philosophers stop at this
conclusion。 They sometimes extend the same inference to the
mind itself； in its internal operations。 Our mental vision
or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to
us by our Maker。 When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to
any object； and raise up its image in the fancy； it is not
the will which creates that idea： It is the universal
Creator； who discovers it to the mind； and renders it
present to us。
Thus； according to these philosophers； every thing is
full of God。 Not content with the principle； that nothing
exists but by his will； that nothing possesses any power but
by his concession： They rob nature； and all created beings；
of every power； in order to render their dependence on the
Deity still more sensible and immediate。 They consider not
that； by this theory； they diminish； instead of magnifying；
the grandeur of those attributes； which they affect so much
to celebrate。 It argues surely more power in the Deity to
delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures
than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition。
It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the
world with such perfect foresight that； of itself； and by
its proper operation； it may serve all the purposes of
providence； than if the great Creator were obliged every
moment to adjust its parts； and animate by his breath all
the wheels of that stupendous machine。
But if we would have a more philosophical confutation
of this theory； perhaps the two following reflections may
suffice：
； it seems to me that this theory of the
universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too
bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man； sufficiently
apprized of the weakness of human reason； and the narrow
limits to which it is confined in all its operations。 Though
the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so
logical； there must arise a strong suspicion； if not an
absolute assurance； that it has carried us quite beyond the
reach of our faculties； when it leads to conclusions so
extraordinary； and so remote from common life and
experience。 We are got into fairy land； long ere we have
reached the last steps of our theory； and there we have no
reason to trust our common methods of argument； or to think
that our usual analogies and probabilities have any
authority。 Our line is too short to fathom such immense
abysses。 And however we may flatter ourselves that we are
guided； in every step which we take； by a kind of
verisimilitude and experience； we may be assured that this
fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to
subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience。
But on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards。＇19＇
； I cannot perceive any force in the
arguments on which this theory is founded。 We are ignorant；
it is true； of the manner in which bodies operate on each
other： Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible：
But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by
which a mind； even the supreme mind； operates either on
itself or on body？ Whence； I beseech you； do we acquire any
idea of it？ We have no sentiment or consciousness of this
power in ourselves。 We have no idea of the Supreme Being but
what we learn from reflection on our own faculties。 Were our
ignorance； therefore； a good reason for rejecting any thing；
we should be led into that principle of denying all energy
in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter。 We
surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the
other。 Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may
arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition？ All
we know is our profound ignorance in both cases。＇20＇
* * * *
PART II。
B/UT to hasten to a conclusion of this argument； which
is already drawn out to too great a length： We have sought
in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all
the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived。 It
appears that； in single instances of the operation of
bodies； we never can； by our utmost scrutiny； discover any
thing but one event following another； without being able to
comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates；
or any connexion between it and its supposed effect。 The
same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of
mind on body where we observe the motion of the latter to
follow upon the volition of the former； but are not able to
observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion
and volition； or the energy by which the mind produces this
effect。 The authority of the will over its own faculties and
ideas is not a whit more comprehensible： So that； upon the
whole； there appears