按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
importance； enforces them in the mind； and renders them the
governing principle of our actions。 I hear at present； for
instance； a person's voice； with whom I am acquainted； and
the sound comes as from the next room。 This impression of my
senses immediately conveys my thought to the person；
together with all the surrounding objects。 I paint them out
to myself as existing at present； with the same qualities
and relations； of which I formerly knew them possessed。
These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an
enchanted castle。 They are very different to the feeling；
and have a much greater influence of every kind； either to
give pleasure or pain； joy or sorrow。
Let us； then； take in the whole compass of this
doctrine； and allow； that the sentiment of belief is nothing
but a conception more intense and steady than what attends
the mere fictions of the imagination； and that this
of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the
object with something present to the memory or senses： I
believe that it will not be difficult； upon these
suppositions； to find other operations of the mind analogous
to it； and to trace up these phenomena to principles still
more general。
We have already observed that nature has established
connexions among particular ideas； and that no sooner one
idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its
correlative； and carries our attention towards it； by a
gentle and insensible movement。 These principles of
connexion or association we have reduced to three； namely；
； and ； which are the
only bonds that unite our thoughts together； and beget that
regular train of reflection or discourse； which； in a
greater or less degree； takes place among all mankind。 Now
here arises a question； on which the solution of the present
difficulty will depend。 Does it happen； in all these
relations； that； when one of the objects is presented to the
senses or memory； the mind is not only carried to the
conception of the correlative； but reaches a steadier and
stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have
been able to attain？ This seems to be the case with that
belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect。
And if the case be the same with the other relations or
principles of associations； this may be established as a
general law； which takes place in all the operations of the
mind。
We may； therefore； observe； as the first experiment to
our present purpose； that； upon the appearance of the
picture of an absent friend； our idea of him is evidently
enlivened by the ； and that every passion；
which that idea occasions； whether of joy or sorrow；
acquires new force and vigour。 In producing this effect；
there concur both a relation and a present impression。 Where
the picture bears him no resemblance； at least was not
intended for him； it never so much as conveys our thought to
him： And where it is absent； as well as the person； though
the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the
other； it feels its idea to be rather weakened than
enlivened by that transition。 We take a pleasure in viewing
the picture of a friend； when it is set before us； but when
it is removed； rather choose to consider him directly than
by reflection in an image； which is equally distant and
obscure。
The ceremonies of the R/OMAN C/ATHOLIC religion may
be considered as instances of the same nature。 The devotees
of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the
mummeries； with which they are upbraided； that they feel the
good effect of those external motions； and postures； and
actions； in enlivening their devotion and quickening their
fervour； which otherwise would decay； if directed entirely
to distant and immaterial objects。 We shadow out the objects
of our faith； say they； in sensible types and images； and
render them more present to us by the immediate presence of
these types； than it is possible for us to do merely by an
intellectual view and contemplation。 Sensible objects have
always a greater influence on the fancy than any other； and
this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which
they are related； and which they resemble。 I shall only
infer from these practices； and this reasoning； that the
effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very
common； and as in every case a resemblance and a present
impression must concur； we are abundantly supplied with
experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle。
We may add force to these experiments by others of a
different kind； in considering the effects of
as well as of 。 It is certain that distance
diminishes the force of every idea； and that； upon our
approach to any object； though it does not discover itself
to our senses； it operates upon the mind with an influence；
which imitates an immediate impression。 The thinking on any
object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous；
but it is only the actual presence of an object； that
transports it with a superior vivacity。 When I am a few
miles from home； whatever relates to it touches me more
nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant； though
even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the
neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an
idea of them。 But as in this latter case； both the objects
of the mind are ideas； notwithstanding there is an easy
transition between them； that transition alone is not able
to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas； for want of
some immediate impression。＇13＇
No one can doubt but causation has the same influence
as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity。
Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and
holy men； for the same reason； that they seek after types or
images； in order to enliven their devotion； and give them a
more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary
lives； which they desire to imitate。 Now it is evident； that
one of the best reliques； which a devotee could procure；
would be the handywork of a saint； and if his cloaths and
furniture are ever to be considered in this light； it is
because they were once at his disposal； and were moved and
affected by him； in which respect they are to be considered
as imperfect effects； and as connected with him by a shorter
chain of consequences than any of those； by which we learn
the reality of his existence。
Suppose； that the son of a friend； who had been long
dead or absent； were presented to us； it is evident； that
this object would instantly revive its correlative idea； and
recall to our thoughts all past intimacies and
familiarities； in more lively colours than they would
otherwise have appeared to us。 This is another phaenomenon；
which seems to prove the principle above mentioned。
We may observe； that； in these phaenomena； the belief
of the correlative object is always presupposed； without
which the relation could have no effect。 The influence of
the picture supposes； that we our friend to have
once existed。 Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas