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bread we expect like nourishment and support。 But this
surely is a step or progress of the mind； which wants to be
explained。 When a man says； And when he says； ； he is not guilty of a tautology； nor are these
propositions in any respect the same。 You say that the one
proposition is an inference from the other。 But you must
confess that the inference is not intuitive； neither is it
demonstrative： Of what nature is it； then？ To say it is
experimental； is begging the question。 For all inferences
from experience suppose； as their foundation； that the
future will resemble the past； and that similar powers will
be conjoined with similar sensible qualities。 If there be
any suspicion that the course of nature may change； and that
the past may be no rule for the future； all experience
becomes useless； and can give rise to no inference or
conclusion。 It is impossible； therefore； that any arguments
from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to
the future； since all these arguments are founded on the
supposition of that resemblance。 Let the course of things be
allowed hitherto ever so regular； that alone； without some
new argument or inference； proves not that； for the future；
it will continue so。 In vain do you pretend to have learned
the nature of bodies from your past experience。 Their secret
nature； and consequently all their effects and influence；
may change； without any change in their sensible qualities。
This happens sometimes； and with regard to some objects： Why
may it not happen always； and with regard to all objects？
What logic； what process or argument secures you against
this supposition？ My practice； you say； refutes my doubts。
But you mistake the purport of my question。 As an agent； I
am quite satisfied in the point； but as a philosopher； who
has some share of curiosity； I will not say scepticism； I
want to learn the foundation of this inference。 No reading；
no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty； or
give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance。 Can I
do better than propose the difficulty to the public； even
though； perhaps； I have small hopes of obtaining a solution？
We shall at least； by this means； be sensible of our
ignorance； if we do not augment our knowledge。
I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable
arrogance who concludes； because an argument has escaped his
own investigation； that therefore it does not really exist。
I must also confess that； though all the learned； for
several ages； should have employed themselves in fruitless
search upon any subject； it may still； perhaps； be rash to
conclude positively that the subject must； therefore； pass
all human comprehension。 Even though we examine all the
sources of our knowledge； and conclude them unfit for such a
subject； there may still remain a suspicion； that the
enumeration is not complete； or the examination not
accurate。 But with regard to the present subject； there are
some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation
of arrogance or suspicion of mistake。
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid
peasants nay infants； nay even brute beasts improve by
experience； and learn the qualities of natural objects； by
observing the effects which result from them。 When a child
has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a
candle； he will be careful not to put his hand near any
candle； but will expect a similar effect from a cause which
is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance。 If you
assert； therefore； that the understanding of the child is
led into this conclusion by any process of argument or
ratiocination； I may justly require you to produce that
argument； nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a
demand。 You cannot say that the argument is abstruse； and
may possibly escape your enquiry； since you confess that it
is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant。 If you
hesitate； therefore； a moment； or if； after reflection； you
produce any intricate or profound argument； you； in a
manner； give up the question； and confess that it is not
reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling
the future； and to expect similar effects from causes which
are； to appearance； similar。 This is the proposition which I
intended to enforce in the present section。 If I be right； I
pretend not to have made any mighty discovery。 And if I be
wrong； I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very
backward scholar； since I cannot now discover an argument
which； it seems； was perfectly familiar to me long before I
was out of my cradle。
* * * *
SECTION V。
Sceptical Solution of these Doubts。
PART I。
T/HE passion for philosophy； like that for religion；
seems liable to this inconvenience； that； though it aims at
the correction of our manners； and extirpation of our vices；
it may only serve； by imprudent management； to foster a
predominant inclination； and push the mind； with more
determined resolution； towards that side which already
too much； by the bias and propensity of the natural
temper。 It is certain that； while we aspire to the
magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage； and endeavour
to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds； we
may； at last； render our philosophy like that of
E/PICTETUS； and other ； only a more refined system
of selfishness； and reason ourselves out of all virtue as
well as social enjoyment。 While we study with attention the
vanity of human life； and turn all our thoughts towards the
empty and transitory nature of riches and honours； we are；
perhaps； all the while flattering our natural indolence；
which； hating the bustle of the world； and drudgery of
business； seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full
and uncontrolled indulgence。 There is； however； one species
of philosophy which seems little liable to this
inconvenience； and that because it strikes in with no
disorderly passion of the human mind； nor can mingle itself
with any natural affection or propensity； and that is the
A/CADEMIC or S/CEPTICAL philosophy。 The academics always
talk of doubt and suspense of judgment； of danger in hasty
determinations； of confining to very narrow bounds the
enquiries of the understanding； and of renouncing all
speculations which lie not within the limits of common life
and practice。 Nothing； therefore； can be more contrary than
such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind； its
rash arrogance； its lofty pretensions； and its superstitious
credulity。 Every passion is mortified by it； except the love
of truth； and that passion never is； nor can be； carried to
too high a degree。 It is surprising； therefore； that this
philosophy； which； in almost every instance； must be
harmless and innocent； should be the subject of so much
groundless reproach and