按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
trikers； armed with rifles and dynamite； thereupon attacked the nonunion men and drove them off； but many lives were lost in the struggle and much property was destroyed。 The strikers proved too strong for any force which state authority could muster； but upon the call of the Governor； President Harrison ordered federal troops to the scene and under martial law order was soon restored。
Further evidence of popular unrest was given in August by a strike of the switchmen in the Buffalo railway yards； which paralyzed traffic until several thousand state troops were put on guard。 About the same time； there were outbreaks in the Tennessee coal districts in protest against the employment of convict labor in the mines。 Bands of strikers seized the mines； and in some places turned loose the convicts and in other places escorted them back to prison。 As a result of this disturbance； during 1892 state troops were permanently stationed in the mining districts； and eventually the convicts were put back at labor in the mines。
Such occurrences infused bitterness into the campaign of 1892 and strongly affected the election returns。 Weaver carried Colorado； Idaho； Kansas； and Nevada； and he got one electoral vote in Oregon and in North Dakota； but even if these twenty…two electoral votes had gone to Harrison； he would still have been far behind Cleveland； who received 277 electoral votes out of a total of 444。 Harrison ran only about 381；000 behind Cleveland in the popular vote； but in four States； the Democrats had nominated no electors and their votes had contributed to the poll of over a million for Weaver。 The Democratic victory was so sweeping that it gained the Senate as well as the House； and now for the first time a Democratic President was in accord with both branches of Congress。 It was soon to appear； however； that this party accord was merely nominal。
CHAPTER IX。 THE FREE SILVER REVOLT
The avenging consequences of the Silver Purchase Act moved so rapidly that when John Griffin Carlisle took office as Secretary of the Treasury in 1893； the gold reserve had fallen to 100；982；410only 982；410 above the limit indicated by the Act of 1882and the public credit was shaken by the fact that it was an open question whether the government obligation to pay a dollar was worth so much or only one half so much。 The latter interpretation； indeed； seemed impending。 The new Secretary's first step was to adopt the makeshift expedient of his predecessors。 He appealed to the banks for gold and backed up by patriotic exhortation from the press； he did obtain almost twenty…five millions in gold in exchange for notes。 But as even more notes drawing out the gold were presented for redemption； the Secretary's efforts were no more successful than carrying water in a sieve。
Of the notes presented for redemption during March and April； nearly one…half were treasury notes of 1890； which by law the Secretary might redeem 〃in gold or silver coin at his discretion。〃 The public was now alarmed by a rumor that Secretary Carlisle； who while in Congress had voted for free silver； would resort to silver payments on this class of notes； and regarded his statements as being noncommittal on the point。 Popular alarm was； to some extent； dispelled by a statement from President Cleveland； on the 23rd of April； declaring flatly and unmistakably that redemption in gold would be maintained。 But the financial situation throughout the country was such that nothing could stave off the impending panic。 Failures were increasing in number； some large firms broke under the strain； and the final stroke came on the 5th of May when the National Cordage Company went into bankruptcy。 As often happens in the history of panics； the event was trivial in comparison with the consequences。 This company was of a type that is the reproach of American jurisprudencethe marauding corporation。 In the very month in which it failed； it declared a large cash dividend。 Its stock； which had sold at 147 in January； fell in May to below ten dollars a share。 Though the Philadelphia and Reading Railway Company； which failed in February； had a capital of 40；000；000 and a debt of more than 125；000；000； the market did not break completely under that strain。 The National Cordage had a capital of 20；000；000 and liabilities of only 10；000；000； but its collapse brought down with it the whole structure of credit。 A general movement of liquidation set in； which throughout the West was so violent as to threaten general bankruptcy。 Nearly all of the national bank failures were in the West and South； and still more extensive was the wreck of state banks and private banks。 It had been the practice of country banks； while firmly maintaining local rates； to keep the bulk of their resources on deposit with city banks at two per cent。 This practice now proved to be a fatal entanglement to many institutions。 There were instances in which country banks were forced to suspend； though cash resources were actually on the way to them from depository centers。*
* Out of 158 national bank failures during the year； 153 were in the West and South。 In addition there went down 172 state banks； 177 private banks； 47 savings banks； 13 loan and trust companies； and 6 mortgage companies。
Even worse than the effect of these numerous failures on the business situation was the derangement which occurred in the currency supply。 The circulating medium was almost wholly composed of bank notes； treasury notes； and treasury certificates issued against gold and silver in the Treasury； coin being little in use except as fractional currency。 Bank notes were essentially treasury certificates issued upon deposits of government bonds。 In effect； the circulating medium was composed of government securities reduced to handy bits。 Usually； a bank panic tends to bring note issues into rapid circulation for what they will fetch； but in this new situation； people preferred to impound the notes； which they knew to be good whatever happened so long as the Government held out。 Private hoarding became so general that currency tended to disappear。 Between September 30； 1892 and October 31； 1893； the amount of deposits in the national banks shrank over 496；000；000。 Trade was reduced to making use of the methods of primitive barter； though the emergency was met to some extent by the use of checks and clearinghouse certificates。 In many New England manufacturing towns； for example； checks for use in trade were drawn in denominations from one dollar up to twenty。 In some cases； corporations paid off their employees in checks drawn on their own treasurers which served as local currency。 In some Southern cities； clearing…house certificates in small denominations were issued for general circulationin Birmingham； Alabama； for sums as small as twenty…five cents。 It is worth noting that a premium was paid as readily for notes as for gold； indeed； the New York 〃Financial Chronicle〃 reported that the premium on currency was from two to three per cent； while the premium on gold was only one and one half per cent。 Before the panic had ended； the extraordinary spectacle was presented of gold coins serving as a medium of trade because treasury notes and ban