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e。g。＇ visible； unless when they have been parted from the wholes。 So
the footlength too exists potentially in the two…foot length； but
actually only when it has been separated from the whole。 But objective
increments so small as those above might well； if separated from their
totals； ＇instead of achieving 'actual' exisistence＇ be dissolved in
their environments； like a drop of sapid moisture poured out into
the sea。 But even if this were not so ＇sc。 with the objective
magnitude＇； still； since the ＇subjective＇ of sense…perception is not
perceptible in itself； nor capable of separate existence （since it
exists only potentially in the more distinctly perceivable whole of
sense…perception）； so neither will it be possible to perceive
＇actually＇ its correlatively small object ＇sc。 its quantum of
pathema or sensible quality＇ when separated from the object…total。 But
yet this ＇small object＇ is to be considered as perceptible： for it
is both potentially so already ＇i。e。 even when alone＇； and destined to
be actually so when it has become part of an aggregate。 Thus；
therefore； we have shown that some magnitudes and their sensible
qualities escape notice； and the reason why they do so； as well as the
manner in which they are still perceptible or not perceptible in
such cases。 Accordingly then when these ＇minutely subdivided＇
sensibles have once again become aggregated in a whole in such a
manner； relatively to one another； as to be perceptible actually；
and not merely because they are in the whole； but even apart from
it； it follows necessarily ＇from what has been already stated＇ that
their sensible qualities； whether colours or tastes or sounds； are
limited in number。
One might ask：… do the objects of sense…perception； or the
movements proceeding from them （＇since movements there are；＇ in
whichever of the two ways ＇viz。 by emanations or by stimulatory
kinesis＇ sense…perception takes place）； when these are actualized
for perception； always arrive first at a spatial middle point ＇between
the sense…organ and its object＇； as Odour evidently does； and also
Sound？ For he who is nearer ＇to the odorous object＇ perceives the
Odour sooner ＇than who is farther away＇； and the Sound of a stroke
reaches us some time after it has been struck。 Is it thus also with an
object seen； and with Light？ Empedocles； for example； says that the
Light from the Sun arrives first in the intervening space before it
comes to the eye； or reaches the Earth。 This might plausibly seem to
be the case。 For whatever is moved ＇in space＇； is moved from one place
to another； hence there must be a corresponding interval of time
also in which it is moved from the one place to the other。 But any
given time is divisible into parts； so that we should assume a time
when the sun's ray was not as yet seen； but was still travelling in
the middle space。
Now； even if it be true that the acts of 'hearing' and 'having
heard'； and； generally； those of 'perceiving' and 'having
perceived'； form co…instantaneous wholes； in other words； that acts of
sense…perception do not involve a process of becoming； but have
their being none the less without involving such a process； yet；
just as； ＇in the case of sound＇； though the stroke which causes the
Sound has been already struck； the Sound is not yet at the ear （and
that this last is a fact is further proved by the transformation which
the letters ＇viz。 the consonants as heard＇ undergo ＇in the case of
words spoken from a distance＇； implying that the local movement
＇involved in Sound＇ takes place in the space between ＇us and the
speaker＇； for the reason why ＇persons addressed from a distance＇ do
not succeed in catching the sense of what is said is evidently that
the air ＇sound wave＇ in moving towards them has its form changed）
＇granting this； then； the question arises＇： is the same also true in
the case of Colour and Light？ For certainly it is not true that the
beholder sees； and the object is seen； in virtue of some merely
abstract relationship between them； such as that between equals。 For
if it were so； there would be no need ＇as there is＇ that either ＇the
beholder or the thing beheld＇ should occupy some particular place；
since to the equalization of things their being near to； or far
from； one another makes no difference。
Now this ＇travelling through successive positions in the medium＇ may
with good reason take place as regards Sound and Odour； for these；
like ＇their media＇ Air and Water； are continuous； but the movement
of both is divided into parts。 This too is the ground of the fact that
the object which the person first in order of proximity hears or
smells is the same as that which each subsequent person perceives；
while yet it is not the same。
Some； indeed； raise a question also on these very points； they
declare it impossible that one person should hear； or see； or smell；
the same object as another； urging the impossibility of several
persons in different places hearing or smelling ＇the same object＇； for
the one same thing would ＇thus＇ be divided from itself。 The answer
is that； in perceiving the object which first set up the motion… e。g。
a bell； or frankincense； or fire… all perceive an object numerically
one and the same； while； of course； in the special object perceived
they perceive an object numerically different for each； though
specifically the same for all； and this； accordingly； explains how it
is that many persons together see； or smell； or hear ＇the same
object＇。 These things ＇the odour or sound proper＇ are not bodies； but
an affection or process of some kind （otherwise this ＇viz。
simultaneous perception of the one object by many＇ would not have
been； as it is； a fact of experience） though； on the other hand； they
each imply a body ＇as their cause＇。
But ＇though sound and odour may travel；＇ with regard to Light the
case is different。 For Light has its raison d'etre in the being ＇not
becoming＇ of something； but it is not a movement。 And in general； even
in qualitative change the case is different from what it is in local
movement ＇both being different species of kinesis＇。 Local movements；
of course； arrive first at a point midway before reaching their goal
（and Sound； it is currently believed； is a movement of something
locally moved）； but we cannot go on to assert this ＇arrival at a point
midway＇ like manner of things which undergo qualitative change。 For
this kind of change may conceivably take place in a thing all at once；
without one half of it being changed before the other； e。g。 it is
conceivable that water should be frozen simultaneously in every
part。 But still； for all that； if the body which is heated or frozen
is extensive； each part of it successively is affected by the part
contiguous； while the part first chan